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Abstract 
Existential debates – regarding life, death, and the states which potentially succeed 
existence – have widespread spiritual and ethical implications for general society.  Rather than 
aimlessly questioning the metaphysical value of death on life, there are clear bioethical 
applications to exploring exaggerated human death anxieties.  These fears are unique to our species 
and have wide-spread societal repercussions.  By and large, discomfort with the notion of mortality 
permeates unequivocally throughout our species’ histories.  We become our own worst enemies 
when we fail to admit and confront the inevitability of death.  The lack of mortality salience 
encouraged by our trepidations fuels an immortality narrative that dismisses death in favor of a 
presumption of human invincibility. The repercussions of such attitudes regarding thanatology can 
be readily observed throughout healthcare, judicial, religious, and funeral sectors, etc.  Death 
anxieties further allow irrationality to proliferate.  Therefore, in order to address our trepidations, 
it is essential that we first identify the source of these fears.  Given the status of narrative and 
storytelling in all aspects of human life, it is proposed that our preoccupations with legacy are 
preventing us from addressing our fears re mortality and preventing us from attaining sufficient 
mortality salience.  Legacy is defined as an all-inclusive term referencing a subjective evaluation 
during life that impacts an individual’s reputation posthumously.  In order to assert the absurdity 
of legacy’s influence on our perceptions of death, we will refute potential counterarguments in the 
forms of posthumous harm and demonstrate the impracticality of the fear-based narrative that 
currently surrounds mortality.  In doing so, we will largely favor Epicurean attitudes towards death, 
in order to contradict both the generally accepted mortal harm and posthumous harm theses, by 
claiming that 1) one is not harmed by their own death and 2) one cannot be harmed after their own 
death.  Our argument regarding the harmful effects of legacy on thanatological fears has both 
theoretical and practical implications, especially with regards to various bioethical concerns.  
Specifically, regarding the legalization of physician-assisted death, we will be illustrating that, 
from a utility perspective, such measures appear rational and warrant legal endorsement.  Other 
applied bioethical issues (e.g. presumption of posthumous consent, cadaver organ transplantation 
procedures, etc.) will also benefit from the implications of studying the effects of legacy-derived 
death anxieties on mortality salience. 
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I. Introduction  
Death can be interpreted through many lenses.  It can be viewed as a promise, an illusion, 
a transformation, or even a penance.1  Irrespective of these many interpretations, most human 
attitudes relating to death convey fear.  Such fear is usually attributed to evolutionary perspectives 
concerning the survival of a species, but this is a gross oversimplification of the phenomenon and 
fails to completely account for the universality of death anxieties, independent of biological 
variables like age and fertility.2,3  As a result of the overgeneralization of such evolutionary 
explanations, death anxieties remain overly exaggerated.4  However, these evolutionary accounts 
are not sufficient to explain the debilitating nature of human death anxieties in their current chronic 
states.   
The various psychological crutches that propagate narratives of human invincibility by 
encouraging interconnected adverse attitudes (including denial, avoidance, and fear) towards death 
may seem, at times, to be beneficial or motivational, but they are not useful in their exaggerated 
forms.  While there may be perceived benefits to the development of death avoidance mechanisms, 
the consequences of such crutches5 are ultimately much greater than any of the discernible 
conveniences they may offer.  The repercussions of these exaggerated end-of-life trepidations are, 
                                                      
1 Becker, The Denial of Death. 
2Death anxiety references trepidations induced by thoughts or references to the dead and dying. 
3With regard to death anxieties, there is some distinction between fearing death and fearing the process of dying; these 
distinctions arise from whether the primary target of that fear is a loss of autonomy over one’s pre-humous or posthumous 
legacy.  It should be noted that, as the distinctions between anxieties aimed at death or dying both manifest from the phase 
at which we fear losing the ability to control our legacy, we will largely be equating the two.  The distinctions between 
trepidations regarding death and dying are largely inconsequential, for our purposes.  We will be assuming that both fears 
are rooted in legacy.  While some people fear one (either death or dying), and others fear both; ultimately, most people fear 
one or the other.   
4Nyatanga and de Vocht, “Towards a Definition of Death Anxiety.” 
5 Psychological crutches include denial, dissociation, distraction, etc. 
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unfortunately, too prevalent in the healthcare, religious, and funeral sectors, etc.  And the 
stigmatization of end-of-life issues prevents worrying abuses6 from being detected and addressed.   
Evading the topic of mortality feeds into erroneous narratives of fear, death, and 
invincibility.  These falsehoods can be dangerous.  For example, though a child who does not 
understand (and thus does not fear) death may seem to be in an enviable position, his naivety 
ultimately makes the world a much more dangerous place.  Ignorance is not bliss but rather serves 
as an ever-looming hazard.  Despite the momentary relief against the gravitas of mortality that 
death denial may offer, such avoidance and feigned ignorance offer no real protection.  Self-
deception, by its very nature, perpetuates irrationality.7   
Unaddressed death anxieties can lead towards the general, albeit inadvertent subjugation 
of our species to irrational feelings.  In order to avoid subjugation to irrational fears, it becomes 
necessary to identify and assess the factors that are inducing such responses.  So, this paper will 
be specifically concerned with analyzing the debilitating nature of exaggerated death trepidations, 
rather than any motivational benefits that may be conferred from a more nuanced approach to 
death anxieties.  While the presence of baseline fear conditions can encourage a necessary 
threshold of prudent behaviors, it is possible to condemn the pervasiveness of current chronic death 
anxieties, without encouraging reckless irresponsibility.  After all, mortality salience (awareness 
of the inevitability of death) does not make death more attractive.8  This fact is readily illustrated 
                                                      
6 End-of-life abuses are prevalent.  For example, elder abuse in clinical and social circumstances remains a huge concern, 
especially in long-term healthcare institutions.  See Jayawardena et al., “Elder Abuse at End of Life.” 
7 Referencing epistemic rationality. Nuances between different forms of irrationality will be explored in later sections.   
8Maxfield et al., “Mortality Salience Effects on the Life Expectancy Estimates of Older Adults as a Function of Neuroticism.”  
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due to the observation that suicide considerations fail as measures of mortality salience.9  Mortality 
salience merely allows for a more nuanced approach towards end-of-life issues. 
Death is a-coming. Whether it is wanted or not, warranted or not, its passing is inevitable.  
In order to accept oblivion, we must embrace our trepidations surrounding the natural phenomenon 
of an end.10  Though there are many subsidizing factors11 that are contributing to general death 
anxieties, it is hypothesized that an immortality narrative (propagated by concerns regarding 
legacy) is a principal factor in establishing such fears.  For the purposes of this paper, legacy shall 
be defined as an all-inclusive term referencing a subjective evaluation during life that impacts an 
individual’s reputation posthumously.  Legacy is presumed to be a fluid social-construct that 
describes insights (often obtained through the perception of memories, endowments, 
accomplishments, etc.) that influence an individual’s death narrative; legacy prominently 
influences our perceptions of death, because it is ultimately the most substantiated way of ensuring 
a life after death.  Therefore, it will be conclusively argued that legacy serves a prominent role in 
influencing our end-of-life attitudes and undermining individual awareness of human mortality.  
By establishing that overly prevalent death anxieties are unintelligible, irrational, and harmful, it 
will be possible to demonstrate that the consequences of these attitudes supersede any potential 
benefits that may be attributed to them, in their chronic state.  In order to illustrate this, an 
investigation of exaggerated death anxieties according to Epicurean views is warranted.   
If we acknowledge legacy as a key source of our exaggerated fears, it becomes evident that 
they are largely irrational, in as much as we can assess the rationality of any singular emotion.  
                                                      
9 Burke and Landau, “Death Goes to the Polls: A Meta-Analysis of Mortality Salience Effects on Political Attitudes.” 
10 Referencing eternal oblivion or permanent non-existence. 
11 Such factors include mortality concerns re loss of sentience, deprivation of autonomy, pain, the intrinsic worth of life, 
evolutionary incentives to death anxieties, etc. 
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Throughout this paper, assessments of rationality or the appropriateness of death anxiety will be 
predominantly rooted in the perceived utility of the emotion, rather than moral feelings.12 
Assessing rationality primarily through a normative utility theory13 holds merit for our purposes 
because evolutionary developments are primarily based on the general effectiveness and 
usefulness of inherited traits in conferring fitness to offspring.  The continuous perpetuation of 
certain fears, such as death anxiety, only holds merit if these fears contribute to the species’ or, at 
least, the individual’s self-interest.14  In order to properly acknowledge the utility of our present 
attitudes towards navigating mortality, it is necessary to address the reasonings behind these 
attitudes. While death is not necessarily a moral problem, moral concerns do often need to be 
addressed when investigating the bioethical application of our theory.  A brief consequentialist 
analysis will be included in this paper to support views regarding the unnecessity of current end-
of-life conduct and concerns.  Recognizing the limitations of a harsh Epicurean interpretation of 
death, invoking consequentialism in this discussion regarding the bioethical application of this 
theory will offer a broader scope for interpretation. 
By ascertaining legacy as a key motivational factor in establishing contemporary fears of 
death, the inability or general reluctance to confront the ubiquitous nature of mortality can be 
shown to result in widespread hypocrisies.  Ultimately, these inconsistencies can result in 
systematic issues within various bureaucratic sectors.  Some components of these disparities 
manifest in our handling of end-of-life narratives, but they are not limited to such and have also 
had wide-spread ethical implications in both the healthcare and funeral industries, etc. If we are 
                                                      
12 Murphy, “Rationality and the Fear of Death.” 
13 Utility theories of rational choice are oftentimes descriptive or predictive, but for our purposes, we will be arguing based 
on normative principles of how people should navigate mortality concerns, despite the prevalence of current death 
anxieties.  Utility principles are interested in outcomes that confer the greatest benefits and the least amount of harm. We 
expect to attain preferred outcomes for decision-making when actions are minimally influenced by death anxieties. 
14 Murphy.  
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able to demonstrate that our fears of death are irrational, then the dire consequences that result 
from our trepidations are ultimately unnecessary.  Following the establishment of the critical role 
that legacy serves in conferring death anxiety, we will proceed with an in-depth analysis regarding 
the consequences of legacy-derived death anxieties on debates pertaining to physician-assisted 
suicide.  
Personal concerns regarding the forms of available end-of-life care become increasingly 
prominent with age and sickness, even if these worries are not always vocalized due to the taboo 
nature of such discussions.  Failings to give proper credence to substantive ethical principles of 
health care (e.g. compassionate care, respect, public interest, reasonable distribution of resources) 
that confer pragmatic considerations regarding physician-assisted suicide result in substantive 
societal deficiencies, when these failings are the direct result of the wide-spread nature of 
prominent death anxieties.15  At the conclusion of this paper, we will be specifically investigating 
the relationship between death anxiety and physician-assisted suicide, in order to demonstrate that 
such measures should be rationally permissible and consequentially right.  However, it should be 
emphasized that similar analyses or applications of our argument can be conducted for a diverse 
range of end-of-life care issues (e.g. futile treatment, rationing care, treatment of the deceased, 
etc.) and applied bioethics, with potentially wide-spread policy implications.16  Ultimately, if death 
need not be reasonably feared, policies and attitudes established due to the perpetuation of a ‘death 
is evil’ narrative are unwarranted.  
II. Fear of Death 
                                                      
15 Winkler and Gruen, “First Principles: Substantive Ethics for Healthcare Organizations.” 
16 Karnik and Kanekar, “Ethical Issues Surrounding End-of-Life Care: A Narrative Review.” 
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Prior to our discussion of the rationality of legacy-derived death anxieties, it is necessary 
to describe the significance of trepidations concerning death.  After all, emotions confer quality to 
existence.17 Whether or not emotions are the cause or a principal byproduct of the physiological 
and psychological implications associated with them, the perception of the world is contingent on 
the manifestation of different emotive categories.  It is simplest to interpret the world through a 
black-and-white colored lens that emphasizes such commonplace feelings as happiness, sadness, 
and anger, not because these emotions are always governable, but because they are easier to 
navigate and generally acknowledge.  Even disgust, surprise, and anticipation are not overly 
complicated dispositions.  These sentiments are more targeted and communal; and, for the most 
part, the immediate benefits and repercussions of these emotions are easily made evident due to 
the linear nature of the causal events that precede them.  But it is the seventh (and arguably the 
most primitive emotion) that serves as both our greatest liability and our most adequate defense 
against the follies induced by our other sentiments.   
Fear can be a weapon of unparalleled destruction.  The role of this specific reactionary 
sentiment in society is often underplayed in order to construct and reinforce a narrative of free will 
and independence.  As an emotional response induced by the perception of a threat, it has the 
ability to both paralyze and enslave us.  It could well be argued that it is fear that has the largest 
influence on our individual and collective lives.  From Hobbes’ theory on the implications of fear 
on sovereignty to Stoic attempts aimed at taming natural fears, the concept of fear has long been 
understood to embody significant philosophical influence on day-to-day lives.18,19  And while 
                                                      
17 Düringer, “The Analogy between Emotions and Judgements.” 
18 Jakonen, “Thomas Hobbes on Fear, Mimesis , Aisthesis and Politics.” 
19 Noyes, “Seneca on Death.” 
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recent attitudes on the philosophy of fear have tended to emphasize cognitive theories, there is still 
much to explore outside the scope of neuroscience.    
Again, and again, we find our fears getting the best of us.  Trembling, a rapid heartbeat, 
chills. . . Such are a few of the many physiological symptoms that can be clinically associated with 
fear; however, these underlying symptoms can appear subtle and, at times, negligible when no 
imminent threat is present.20 Apart from anxieties relating to looming dangers and hazards, there 
exist more personal and underlying apprehensions that are uniquely human.  These are often harder 
to recognize and to confront, but the psychological implications of such anxieties are incontestable, 
regardless of their conspicuousness.  Such fears elicit a peculiar type of vulnerability conferred by 
the loss of control.  We are unable to properly confront such trepidations because they are less 
distinguishable and singular.  Some of these apprehensions are more unique, others appear to 
manifest universally.  Ultimately, there exist five categories of fears that are widely acknowledged 
as universal misgivings: these fears include a dread of extinction, mutilation, loss of autonomy, 
separation, and disapproval.21  But our fear of death is unique, in that it encompasses all five of 
these permeating anxieties.  After all, as Aristotle laments, “death is the most terrible of all 
things.”22  Other foundational fears are merely expressions of overarching sub-manifestations of 
death, and to avoid recognizing them as such is a great injustice underlying many societal issues 
that arise from such misperceptions.   
As a consequence of these underlying fears, society appears to be possessed with an 
erroneous conceptualization of death.  Popular culture is filled with subliminal and more overt 
                                                      
20 Steimer, “The Biology of Fear- and Anxiety-Related Behaviors.” 
21 Albrecht, Practical Intelligence : The Art and Science of Common Sense. 
22 Aristotle. and McKeon, Introduction to Aristotle. 
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exhibitions of morbid curiosity and fascination.  This obsession is increasingly evident through an 
investigation into the origins of some of the most common nursery rhymes.  These rhymes are 
intended to be shared among some of the most innocent members of society.  The same lullabies 
that we sing to our children whilst rocking them to sleep at night are fraught with discreet 
reminders of some of the most horrific deaths (and ways to die).  To name just a few, “Jack and 
Jill” refers to the beheadings of King Louis XVI and Queen Marie Antoinette, who were 
decapitated during the French Reign of Terror; “Mary, Mary Quite Contrary” references the 
guillotined Protestant ‘maidens’ that were murdered during the reign of Bloody Mary or Queen 
Mary I; and “Ring around the Rosie” alludes to the physical symptoms and cremation of bodies 
suffering from the bubonic plague, otherwise known as the Black Death.23   
References to death appear everywhere, even in the most inconspicuous places, regardless 
of our deathly fears of personal demise.  Subliminal messages of exaggerated and eccentric 
manifestations of death are indicative of a form of imposter syndrome that can be commonly 
exhibited through the masking of concerns surrounding more personal death anxiety.24  When 
confronted by pop-cultural allusions to the topic, we might sometimes masquerade bravery and 
present a false sense of bravado; but, in reality, we avoid and mitigate our actual fears regarding 
mortality by distancing ourselves from the natural and more personal manifestations of the 
phenomenon.  From as far back as the tales of Genesis, the original fear and ultimate punishment 
is that of death, and on its uncontested throne, it continues to dominate, regardless of shifting 
societal attitudes that have redefined death to be the result of natural limitations, rather than the 
                                                      
23 Maiti, “Of Deception and Dogma: The Delusive History Behind Nursery Rhymes.” 
24 Imposter syndrome refers to a persistent internalized fear usually caused by extreme doubts over one’s abilities and 
potential accomplishments.  We would argue that a similar psychological pattern plagues severe cases of death anxiety, in 
that doubts regarding the innate nature of life and mortality result in the manifestation of similar chronic fears. 
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curse of a foreign entity.25  We euphemize death, and we tiptoe around it when we become 
personally involved and invested in the repercussions of the phenomenon.  Ultimately, mortality 
is at the root of most, if not all, of our fears, anxieties, and uncertainties.  In order to address the 
societal ramifications of such fears, we must first identify the origin of this trepidation.   
As a consequence of their ubiquitous nature, fears of death and fears of dying, in whichever 
forms they manifest, are so prominent within society that they have been previously referenced as 
fundamental to “the mainspring of human activity.”26  In fact, underlying societal connotations 
(e.g. prejudices, voting behaviors, lifestyle choices) that affect general human behavior can largely 
be ascribed to these fears.27  Such trepidations drive us, motivate us, and (to some extent) control 
us, in as far as we are ignorant of them.  We are not the only species that has been observed to fear 
death or bereave the dead, however.28  By evolutionary design, fear of death was necessary to 
ensure the survival and continued operation of a species: fear served as both a mobilizing and 
motivational tactic.    
Due to the inevitability of human mortality, exaggerated versions of such fears appear odd 
when investigated from a longitudinal perspective.  Unlike our evolutionary predecessors or 
mammalian counterparts, versions of death anxiety that manifest in our species transcend 
biological necessity.  Humans tend to postulate and anticipate what occurs after death, in a manner 
that has not been shown to manifest in any other species.  This distinction between death 
apprehension in humans and death awareness in other species may not be used to support the 
theory that it is the fanatic fear of death/dying, specifically, that distinguishes us from other species.  
                                                      
25 Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health. 
26Becker, The Denial of Death.  
27 Burke and Landau, “Death Goes to the Polls: A Meta-Analysis of Mortality Salience Effects on Political Attitudes.” 
28 Brinkmann, “The Grieving Animal: Grief as a Foundational Emotion.” 
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While some issues that are derived from or associated with fears of death (e.g. avoidance of 
premature death, taking precautions to minimize risk-taking behaviors) can be beneficial, we will 
be specifically exploring death anxieties associated with exaggerated29 and contradictory 
responses regarding death and dying.  Motivational benefits to more nuanced death anxieties do 
exist; but chronic trepidations are largely debilitating.  Death anxieties, in their current form, do 
not consistently serve our best interest; and, their general irrationality becomes increasingly 
apparent when we explore the origins of such feelings.  Ultimately, we are not unique in that we 
fear death; we are distinct in how pervasive and ubiquitous this fear is.   
The fact that society cannot ascribe a singular cause to the manifestation of such fears and 
often misinterprets their origin indicates that rationality and reasonableness are not at the core of 
such emotional insecurities.  To expand on the point, evolutionarily-derived animal responses to 
death are reactionary and transpire only after death or a potential cause of death has already arrived, 
while we, on the other hand, are both constantly preoccupied with its paranormality (recalling the 
dead, preparing for an afterlife, postulating the presence of spirits, consulting psychics, etc.) and 
subconsciously oppressing any possible acceptance of personal and more realistic manifestations 
of this phenomenon.  Our own exaggerated ideas of death transcend any expressions of immediate 
danger that would be common among other animals; rather, our trepidations manifest as temporal 
and increasingly chronic ailments of our own innate humanity.  In large part, fears regarding 
mortality are largely contingent on the misconstruing of the source of these trepidations.   
Chronic fears of death are largely disproportionate to potential threats, regardless of 
evolutionary necessity; however, various religious and bureaucratic trends have consistently 
                                                      
29 We believe that a narrative-based approach to addressing the nature of life and death heavily influences the exaggeration 
of these fears in our species.  
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allowed for the domination and propagation of death anxiety within Western cultures.  Western 
religious trends have long supported the rationality of death anxiety in order to promote the 
subjugation of those who may fear the afterlife.30 For example, throughout history, the natural 
phenomenon of dying has been attributed to various deities of death.  Even in early primitive and 
preliterate societies, death was both feared as a foreign evil, but also venerated in order to “offset 
fears about the potential malevolence of the dead towards the living.”31  Today, various religious 
institutions continue to propagate similar narratives; in the process, personal fears regarding the 
unknown and the afterlife are exploited in order to guarantee the continued veneration of religious 
worshippers.  But, are we just as irrational now as we were then regarding our presumptions on 
death?  Have we ever been rational when it comes to this topic?  And, how does an understanding 
of legacy affect the perceived rationality of death anxiety?   
Before exploring the role of death contemplation and death anxiety from a purely 
philosophical standpoint interested in determining the rationality of the phenomenon, a brief 
history of death awareness and attitudes is necessary to interpret the intelligibility of death anxiety.  
This very short historical analysis is needed for the principle reason that considerations on the 
matter of mortality have largely been contingent on general sociocultural attitudes present during 
specific time-periods.  Though other, more prominent factors are in play, it is important to keep 
sociocultural trends in consideration when exploring the less popular philosophical and pagan 
views on matters of death anxiety.  The utility of such emotions in general society is also contingent 
on the specific historical frame of reference.  Varied attitudes towards mortality have changed over 
time to confer different perceptions regarding the agency of death.  While a literal interpretation 
                                                      
30Murphy, “Rationality and the Fear of Death.”   
31 DeSpelder and Strickland, The Last Dance: Encountering Death and Dying. 
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of anthropomorphic manifestations of death became less common after the sixteenth century, the 
foreign nature of death continued to allow people to utilize allegories exemplifying the evilness of 
death to understand the phenomenon.  Despite the progress made by the seventeenth century 
regarding the reduction of death into a natural phenomenon, there remained a grotesque fascination 
with ghosts and ghouls throughout the era.  After which point, the rise of medicine caused a new 
perspective on death to be adopted, in which death was an untimely event of less immediate 
concern than the mechanisms of disease and illness that hastened its coming. However, in the 
process of medical enfranchisement, scientific progress and promises relating to lifespan 
extensions provided a new type of validity to subliminal suggestions of human immortality.32,33    
For centuries, we have been attempting to rationalize our fears by attributing them, albeit 
incorrectly, to various concerns and grievances that were easier to navigate and address.  But, 
ultimately, while heavily influenced by its necessity for survival, apprehension towards death is 
not wholly natural; rather, it is likely determined, at least to some extent, by sociocultural 
influences that propel obsessions with legacy and extrinsic worth.  As death palpably contradicts 
notions of invincibility, discomfort with mortality remains and will always remain pervasive, 
especially in death-denying Western cultures.  However, the many manifestations of death anxiety 
are so extensive that they cannot solely be attributed to sociocultural norms.  There are more 
universal factors driving general immortality narratives within society.  Subconsciously and 
socially, there will always be stronger inclinations to presuppose personal immortality, rather than 
propagate mortality salience.  Subtle immortality narratives persist almost ubiquitously throughout 
                                                      
32 “Angel of Death.” 
33 Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health. 
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our species, because of the prevalence of death anxieties and the impossibility of positing true non-
existence.   
III. Immortality  
It is possible to erroneously justify persistent death anxieties surrounding mortality by 
asserting that an immortality narrative is beneficial, as long as it is comfortable.  After all, thoughts 
of one’s demise invoke discomfort due to the intrinsic and extrinsic values that are commonly 
attributed to human life.  ‘Death is evil,’ so we attempt to posit immortality, in order to escape 
death’s inevitability.  The defensive mechanisms of action that allow for the propagation of our 
immortality narratives include postulations re a soul, an afterlife, legacy, etc.  Even if a deceased 
individual no longer persists on this planet, we attribute to them posthumous rights and interests.  
We preserve the dead’s status among the living in as many ways and for as long as possible. Why 
else would we take such precautions at masking death, even in its most obvious state? 
A thick mask of colored wax for foundation, liquidated rouge on the lips, masking tape to 
keep the hands in place, spiked eye caps that are worn as contacts to force the eyelids closed, and 
an injected needle to wire the lower and upper jaws together prior to embalming. . . There are few 
events in which more care will be taken to maintain one’s appearance than before an open-casket 
funeral.  One’s body is carefully fitted into a best suit, a harrowing tux, or a wedding dress.  
Exhausting efforts are taken to mask the gruesomeness of death, until a corpse begins to resemble 
its living self, once more.  A particularly good funeral home can restore a corpse so well that the 
deceased will merely look to be napping.  Except, unlike the fairytale, these sleeping beauties can 
never be re-awoken.  We disguise death in order to purport an immortality narrative.  Even during 
 17 
a death ritual (like a funeral), much care and attention is taken to mask the phenomenon’s 
unadulterated state.   
Because of our inability to confront death, death anxieties are allowed to propagate 
uncontested.  The concept of eternal oblivion, the ultimate cessation of consciousness and 
existence, can be difficult to concede.  Even those that embrace theological skepticism are not 
immune from postulating an immortal man.  Spirits and ghosts are only the most extreme and 
obvious examples of immortal postulations.  But supernatural creatures are not the only entities 
that are assumed to retain existence following death, as evidenced by the many different 
theological postulations re an afterlife.  Even outside the realm of the occult, speculations 
regarding eternity are largely considered viable due to the difficulty of refuting the ever-elusive 
human soul.34,35  Physical immortality may not be feasible but that does not mean that there are no 
other ways of ensuring continued existence.  In fact, legal, spiritual, and ideological proxies 
commonly appear and are accepted as posthumous substitutes for physical identity.  
Considerations re an antemortem36 state are customary and largely presupposed.  The supposition 
of an antemortem state appears to allow a decedent to maintain the interests of their living 
character, after death.37  And while the antemortem state presents as an illusionary social construct, 
it does allow for the deceased’s status among the living to be maintained long after death.  Hence, 
posthumous rights are attributed to the deceased via his or her antemortem identity.38  Legal 
                                                      
34 Pereira, Faísca, and de Sá-Saraiva, “Immortality of the Soul as an Intuitive Idea: Towards a Psychological Explanation of 
the Origins of Afterlife Beliefs.” 
35 See Whitty, “Immortality.” 
36 Antemortem beings refer to postmortem states in which the decedent would subsist as if he/she persisted in a state that 
mimicked a stage of his/her life.  The antemortem stage assumes a stage ‘like life,’ as if the deceased was still living.  See 
Taylor, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics. 
37 We will refute this notion in a later section.  
38 Winter, “Against Posthumous Rights” 
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considerations (like those that pertain to posthumous rights) afforded to antemortem beings further 
preserve the illusion of immortality.    
Despite the inevitability of death, personal convictions regarding an individual’s innate 
immortality are unusually wide-spread.39,40  Subliminal acknowledgements of antemortem entities 
are extremely pervasive, in the laws and in everyday society.  However, these functional 
manifestations of immortality narratives are a consequence, rather than the cause for the 
pervasiveness of immortality postulations.  In fact, Freud attributed the fear of death to the inability 
to accept one’s own demise: immortality, while irrational, is subconsciously permissible in an 
individual’s mind, simply because we are not unequipped at confronting the foreign nature of 
death.41  Attributing the fear of death to the fact that no one can picture their own end outside the 
passive role of the observer holds merit, as “no one [truly] believes in his own death.”42,43  Due to 
its very nature, non-existence is impossible to fully conceptualize.  And we continue to play an 
active role as an observer in even our best attempts at imagining a world following our individual 
deaths.   
Thus, identity-based immortality narratives are permissible because humans have 
developed tools that allow us to disregard mortality.44  As it is impossible to posit true 
nonexistence, mortality (rather than immortality) is approached as a fable.  In fact, some of the 
most prominent philosophical debates regarding views on posthumous harm and the existence of 
an afterlife are largely contingent on the assumption of some form of immortality.  Even without 
                                                      
39 Pereira, Faísca, and de Sá-Saraiva, “Immortality of the Soul as an Intuitive Idea: Towards a Psychological Explanation of 
the Origins of Afterlife Beliefs.” 
40 Whitty, “Immortality.” 
41 Mitchell and Black, Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought. 
42 Frued, Reflections on War and Death. 
43 Drobot, “Freud on Death.” 
44 Whitty. 
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religious and dualistic insinuations of a soul, an illustrious narrative of invincibility and 
immortality subconsciously proliferates in our societies.  Though in such cases, immortality can 
sometimes be a useful fiction, there are consequences to the benefits that it confers.  In fact, it is 
largely due to these incorrect assumptions regarding general immunity that mourners exhibit 
tremendous shock and grief when confronted with human mortality, in the form of an unexpected 
death.   
Under such circumstances, it is clear that even the starkest materialists cannot evade 
pragmatically positing a non-physical state in order to function according to societal rules and 
expectations.45  As a consequence, dualistic approaches to theories of mind have largely reigned 
supreme throughout human history. In fact, linguistic expressions often presume a dualistic 
interpretation of the mind-body problem, as evidenced by the non-reducible descriptions of the 
world that are often colloquially favored.46  Even apart from linguistic limitations, there are many 
instances in which it is acceptable to refer to and reference the dead as if they were still alive.  For 
example, expressions of grief in anticipation of or following a loss can be characterized by 
symbolic, narrative, and figurative modes of expression that emphasize an acknowledgement of 
the deceased, as if they persist in a living state.47  Such acknowledgements can encourage the 
anthropomorphization of the dead.  It becomes commonplace to communicate with the dead and 
to view them as an intermediary that can intercede on behalf of the living.48  Apart from more 
formal methods of communication, it is also common to express continued connections with the 
                                                      
45 Whitty. 
46 Freed, “Dualism and Language” 
47 Corless et al., “Language of Grief: A Model for Understanding the Expressions of the Bereaved” 
48 Corless et al. 
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dead via casual communications, like ‘I miss you;’ ‘please forgive me,’ and ‘how could you leave 
us like that?’ 
While the consistency with which our species has feared death and exalted immortality 
over the many millennia allows us to recognize the wide-spread nature of these anxieties, it does 
not confer pertinent information regarding the rationality of these fears.  The danger is that in the 
process of prioritizing our intuitive abilities to fear death and postulate immortality, we lose our 
abilities to act reasonably and properly undertake rational deliberation.49  In fact, the post-truth 
era, in which we currently reside, provides ample proof of our inabilities to consistently apprehend 
and assess the validity of facts and reason, as evidenced through the rise of anti-vaccination, fake 
news, flat-earth movements, etc.  There are many circumstances in which death can serve as a 
prominent influence on our lives, so it makes sense that end-of-life matters are no exception to this 
general trend of irrationality.  But, while religiously-derived death anxiety has been predominantly 
attributed to literal interpretations of a human soul, we will now proceed to establish a principal 
role for a different kind of posthumous existence as it relates to legacy, rather than an afterlife.  
However, legacy is only one example expression of human immortality narratives.  Other concepts 
(e.g. the human soul) also have similar ascriptions as that of legacy; however, legacy-derived fears 
present as the simplest expression with which to assess death anxieties as they relate to immortality 
narratives.  
The idolization of legacy allows us to continue to reinforce perceived notions of 
immortality, irrespective of theological differences.  Our subsistence lives on, regardless of genetic 
contributions, through written recordings and documentation of who we are and who we once 
                                                      
49 Bailin, Philosophical Inquiry in Education : The Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society. 
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were.  These records preserve our legacies and provide the basis for an independent spread of 
ideas; this preservation and proliferation of knowledge is uniquely attributed to concepts 
developed by humans.50  At constant war with irrelevance, humans are uniquely equipped to 
contribute to the continuation of the species through the transfer of ideas, notwithstanding 
endowments to the gene pool.  In becoming slaves to history (rather than biology), emulating life 
becomes nearly as important as actually living, hence general infatuations with mechanisms of 
validation and fame.  Eternity is a fable that has collectively possessed us, as a species.  As a 
consequence of this fairytale of immortality, we subsist through life purposefully ignorant of our 
own permeance, until we are unwittingly confronted by it.  Legacy is not equivalent to immortality, 
though we often conflate the two; but legacy does seem to be generally acknowledged as one of 
the most common expressions of human immortality narratives.  Its prevalence can be attributed 
to its status as the only guarantee of eternal relevance.   
IV. Life after Death 
While we sometimes understate the extent of our obsession with legacy, sharing and thus 
preserving personal stories can serve as a way of obtaining validation after death, in the same way 
as it would in life.  In general, societal concerns with legacy are indicative of an elusive battle to 
conserve or impact our postmortem existence; however, postmortem states are ultimately 
undeterred by whatever renditions of individual legacy may manifest.  Legacy is separate from 
life, death, and postmortem existence; but, instead, it is, rather ironically, an embodiment of our 
lives (memories, images, etc.) post-death that fails to be able to affect the dead.  It is necessary to 
make the distinction that while life and existence are rooted in reality, legacy and reputation are 
                                                      
50 Referencing a system that resembles memetics. See Alvarez, “Memetics: An Evolutionary Theory of Cultural 
Transmission.” 
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dependent on perception.  This juxtaposition often leads to futile attempts at trying to analyze these 
perceptive states, as if they were rooted in reality.   
Death anxieties manifest at the intersection of various smaller apprehensions, but the role 
of legacy and narrative are unmistakable.  Legacy perpetuates an immortality narrative, in the same 
way as our acknowledgements of a soul, an afterlife, an antemortem state, etc.  However, there are 
no theological restraints to investigating legacy that would prevent a cohesive admonishment of 
its role in enforcing harmful end-of-life attitudes.  Therefore, the emphasis of this paper is on the 
effects of acknowledging and idolizing legacy, specifically.   
Our narrative-formation capabilities serve as one of the most prominent tools for making 
sense of the world.51 Indicated by our designation as Homo narrans, “the storytelling persons,” 
human beings are creatures designed to partake in the “storytelling impulse,” whether through oral 
or written traditions.52  This unique human characteristic appears to be pervasive throughout all 
aspects of life.  Apart from the social functions of storytelling, we tend to perceive all facets of the 
world in story-format, attributing causes and effects to even the most coincidental and independent 
of circumstances.  As a consequence of the emphasis we place on human narratives, legacy remains 
a pervasive contributing factor affecting our end-of-life narratives.  While it might not be the only 
or most prominent mitigating factor for all individuals, it does play a notable role in contributing 
to the general pervasiveness of death anxieties.  To some variable extent, we all fear death because 
of its influence on legacy.   
                                                      
51Niles, Homo Narrans : The Poetics and Anthropology of Oral Literature. 
52Niles. 
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A good death has the ability to erase history, reset a personal narrative, and ultimately 
overshadow actual existence.  For example, regardless of his status as a war hero, senator, and 
presidential candidate, Senator McCain reached new levels of fame and support following a 
terminal diagnosis; it was his funeral that brought together widespread bipartisan support, more 
than any other singular moment in his life.   From pacifistic leaders (Gandhi, Martin Luther King 
Jr.) and short-lived presidents (John F. Kennedy, Zachary Taylor) to fallen rulers (Cleopatra, Marie 
Antoinette) and celebrities (John Lennon, Steve Irwin), it is their tragic ends that unites these 
timeless figures.  Regardless of their lifetime accomplishments, it is these individuals whose names 
will stand the test of time in renown, surpassing the memory of even more successful counterparts.  
Countless other unassuming individuals have notably only been made infamous or famous as a 
result of their deaths, e.g. most evidently children who were too young to die (JonBenet Ramsey, 
Caylee Anthony, Trayvon Martin).   
Death is all-powerful in its ability to shift the narrative of even the worst lives.  Because of 
the power it invokes, it seems reasonable to fear it.  It provides a layer of immunity to the worst 
individuals in our society, but posthumous attitudes can be quite warped as to confer total 
impermeability, not just exemption.  And, if death has such power in overriding individual lives, 
our preoccupation with death appears warranted to some superficial extent.  Our deaths are part of 
the narratives that people will tell of our lives, and the culmination of our legacy ultimately 
involves the story of our demise.  Fixations regarding fear of death/dying are instigated by the 
realization of a possible extension of life after death that does not involve speculation of an 
afterlife.  And while legacy may not be the foremost consideration re all individual considerations 
regarding the end-of-life, it does maintain a pervasive subconscious influence over many peoples’ 
end-of-life attitudes.    
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The version of hereafter conferred by legacy is certain, as the continuation of life regardless 
of mortality is guaranteed through recorded history (hence growing obsessions with documenting 
immaterial thoughts on various social media platforms, regardless of the absurdity of such 
commentary).  At various points in our life, legacy may play a more prominent role in our death 
anxieties.  But an awareness of legacy always has a subliminal effect on our interpretation and 
understanding of death.  As Homo narrans, we receive validation from the propagation of our 
personal narratives.  Whether through infamy or celebrity, a protected legacy is one that is 
reminisced regardless of decency or personal integrity.  Increased power, money, and fame can 
exponentially expand the overt or conscious emphasis any individual places on their own legacy.  
But the subliminal influence of personal legacy persists throughout much of one’s lifespan.  
Legacy does not necessarily entail glory or some profound reach; in fact, everyone ultimately 
retains the ability to obtain a potentially memorable legacy, and its preservation becomes a 
subliminal consideration for all of us preceding our deaths.   
A memorable legacy can be conferred through the appropriate method of demise, even if 
events preceding death fail to invoke much renown.  However, the kind of death that qualifies as 
an appropriate end to personal existence can have diverse implications.  Despite a general 
consensus re the importance of a good death, there has been little agreement as to the qualifications 
of such a demise.  Depending on whether concerns regarding mortality are effectuated as fears of 
death or fears of dying, the definition of a good death fluctuates.  A good death (or successful 
dying process) tends to invoke thoughts of a pain-free status, emotional well-being, life 
completion, dignity, family, relationships, and quality of life.53  But it is not necessarily this 
description of a good death that we actually seek, subconsciously.  While a good, peaceful death 
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has long been hailed as invaluable, it is ultimately a sudden and tragic demise that confers the most 
immense significance because of its role in preserving a semblance of legacy.  For instance, 
martyrs are hailed as heroes: their legacies are forever preserved, while the inconsequential death 
belongs only to those that our histories readily forget.  As a consequence of the role of legacy in 
promoting death anxieties, the promise that one associates with death, even if it is perverse or 
illogical, can transcend death anxieties usually attributed to normal human beings.  Concerns about 
legacy can actually overshadow fears regarding death, because they are often a foundational source 
for irrational exhibitions of death anxiety.  For example, suicide terrorists accept and even glorify 
their deaths.  While we generally postulate that a peaceful or uneventful death succeeding a long 
life would serve as an ideal death, the best death is ultimately a memorable one, which is why the 
presence of loved ones near the time of death is often prioritized.   
Death (or the lack thereof) also has the unique ability to turn an average sinner into a saint, 
e.g. Saint Sebastian, Saint Polycarp, Saint Dennis, etc.  Once again, it appears that the culmination 
of a life determines the longstanding worth of that life.  The chronicle of one’s end often 
predominates whatever narrative existed during one’s actual lifespan.  We remember the unfairly 
departed and confer upon them the status of heroes posthumously, while those who passed 
uneventfully are less often recalled.  There is a reason that the destruction and removal of statues 
of fallen warriors (even Confederate soldiers who invoke provocative histories) are so 
controversial.  The dead, especially the tragically deceased, are sacred; in fact, it is generally 
agreed that “of the dead, [one should] speak nothing but good” (de mortuis nil nisi bonum).54  This 
idiom is even more applicable to the prematurely or unjustly deceased.  Previously inconspicuous 
individuals that are participants in a tragic demise are much more likely to invoke particular 
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sympathies, even relative to widely beloved characters (who would be more strongly missed). 
Even increasingly problematic and controversial public figures can be heralded following their 
demise if their death is sudden and despondent enough.  It is relatively common to grieve the 
deaths of characters who were disliked, either from guilt, remorse, or a natural reaction to loss.  
Most recently, celebrities like XXXTentacion and Michael Jackson, who have been previously 
recognized as predators of the worst kind, were posthumously honored by a widespread consensus 
of public mourning.   
This concept of a good death that guarantees a substantiated legacy is not necessarily a new 
one.  By studying anomalies in human behavior, it is evident that the principal concerns that spur 
death anxieties revolve around legacy, rather than actual death.  Despite the stigmas associated 
with death, it is not always the case that we protect our own lives above all.  For example, 
martyrdom has long been heralded and, to some extent, is a uniquely human phenomenon.   Other 
species, most commonly arachnids (which can engage in intraspecies cannibalism to ensure the 
survival of the young or as part of mating rituals), have been shown to exhibit somewhat parallel 
behaviors (e.g. female Stegodyphus dumicola spiders sacrifice themselves by allowing younger 
members of the family group to feed on them).55  But, martyrdom in humans is neither brought 
about out of evolutionary necessity, nor is it a reactionary biological predisposition (e.g. female 
Stegodyphus dumicola spiders begin physically liquidating to produce nourishing fluids once the 
eggs are hatched).56 Somehow, martyrs who exhibit no psychopathy or psychological 
abnormalities choose to die; while seemingly unintelligible, this choice can be somewhat explained 
or rationalized when examined through the lens of legacy.  A sacrifice (whether it be in the form 
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of a belief, a stance, or another human being) that does not directly impact the survival of the 
species may not be evolutionarily rational from a biological perspective, but it does make for a 
memorable demise (to say the least).  Under the right circumstances, even unassuming individuals 
can make the ultimate sacrifice, which we observe when people are willing to risk their safety 
during terror attacks or natural disasters. 
Further evidence re the status conferred by legacy is the manner in which we treat the dead. 
While death doesn’t discriminate between individuals, populaces, species, etc., our emotional 
sympathies and lamentations certainly do, because of narcissistic perceptions of individual merit.  
Our postmortem status and, subsequently, the state of our deaths are judged in accordance with 
our legacy narrative.  It is well-established that there is a duplicitous hierarchy that determines 
whose lives deserve to be saved (which can be readily observed by studying access to care issues), 
regardless of any inherent, equal human worth that a cultivated society endorses.  But even 
following death, there is no equality; this is true despite the fact that after death, all that remains 
are mere leftover remnants of the barest corporal vessels.  Ultimately, an inexorable hierarchy also 
determines those who deserve to be mourned.  For instance, the type of departure that is ultimately 
endured can greatly affect the perceived value of one’s former life.  Hundreds (sometimes 
thousands) of mourners will show up at the memorial of a young murder victim or a fallen war 
hero, while other unclaimed corpses lie largely unacknowledged and alone until the state 
legislature can appoint a funeral director to handle the largely unfavorable affair.  We all want to 
be remembered, mourned.  It is for this reason that large contributions and memorial sites are 
commonly erected in the names of deceased family members.  This is also one of the reasons why 
studies have shown that family and relationships remain heavily emphasized in our conscious 
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definitions of a good death.57  There is no sadder image than that of an unclaimed Jane Doe rotting 
away alone, undiscovered, unacknowledged, and forgotten.   
An unpleasant death usually warrants aversion because of the pain and loneliness that can 
be associated with it.  However, concerns regarding the way in which such a death may impact 
legacy are less warranted.  Legacy is usually acknowledged as an important contributor to our fear 
of death, because general evaluations regarding the ability of legacy to impact our deaths – and 
consequently our postmortem state of (non)existence – are incorrectly assumed (Figure 1).    
 
Figure 1. Most commonly presumed representative relationship between perceptive 
measures of reputation and legacy as they affect states of life, death, and postmortem 
(non)existence.  Reputation and legacy are generally acknowledged as being able to influence one 
another, while legacy is purported to affect the status of postmortem beings.          
 
While we attribute concerns regarding legacy as capable of ascribing illicit postmortem 
consequences, the truth is that this assumption is erroneous.   Postmortem beings would no longer 
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be concerned about human existence.  Human issues would not be able to affect posthumous lives 
in ways that would pertain to their self-interest.  Therefore, legacy, like reputation, can only 
influence the living.  Thus, if we are assessing rationality in terms of self-seeking utility, then 
concerns about posthumous legacy would be immaterial to the affected party.  While we might 
think that we should care about how we are posthumously remembered through legacy, ultimately 
this is of no consequence to either our living or posthumous state.58   
After our deaths, we have no control over how others will continue to perceive us.  There 
are many cases with which we could establish precedents regarding our assumption that one is not 
directly concerned by that which they cannot render control over.  And, while, in some cases, we 
may be able to confer minimal control over the initiation of death or the state of existence 
immediately prior to our death, such control is rarely direct and often severely limited.  Hence, 
individuals generally find no need to preemptively address fears of death or its inevitability.  
Because death anxieties are allowed to propagate without consequence, myths of immortality 
continue to proliferate and contribute to our anxieties.   
As we’ve previously stated, as a result of such immortality concerns, legacy becomes a 
more established concern among the general populace.  Because of its status, it is necessary to 
understand how legacy manifests.  While legacy is often confused as a subsidiary of the death 
state, this is incorrect; in fact, such a presumption actually unfairly contributes to our irrational 
fears regarding death, as this false categorization results in the supposition of posthumous effects 
                                                      
58Even if we perceive that it is intelligible for us to care about how we are remembered, our legacies ultimately have no 
consequence.  They subsist only after we die, but they can have absolutely no effect on our posthumous state.  We will 
continue to return to this idea in later sections. 
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by legacy.  Thus, though it presents an intelligible and commonly accepted timeline, the first 
schematic is inherently incorrect (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 2. Representative relationship between perceptive measures of reputation and legacy 
as they affect states of life and postmortem (non)existence.  Reputation and legacy are 
acknowledged as being able to influence life and one another, but there is no direct relationship 
between legacy and postmortem (non)existence.   
 
Rather, there are three key ideas represented using this second schematic: death is a 
transitionary moment in time; we can impact reputation throughout life; and legacy can be equated 
to a continuation of reputation (Figure 2).  Distinct derivations from separate stages of existence 
cannot be interconnected, apart from each sphere. But reputation and legacy do represent as 
anatomically continuous third-party interpretations of self.  While we tend to presume that 
preoccupations with reputation exist only in life and that reputation transforms into legacy, as it 
relates to earthly death, these two intuitive lenses of reputation and legacy need to be somewhat 
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distinguished, according to the state of the subject.  They may be anatomically continuous, but 
they are phenotypically diverse. 
Legacy is subjective, and while it is often used in relation to posthumous reputation, such 
an insinuation wrongly posits the possibility of posthumous harm.  Legacy affects our perception 
of death, but it cannot actually affect those that have died (Figure 2).  Death is ultimately not a 
state of being, but rather a singular phenomenon that is independent of both life and the 
postmortem state.  Death merely allows for the passage from one phase of existence to the other.  
Therefore, it is an oversimplification of the phenomenon to assume that it is possible for perceptive 
mechanisms that occur during life to affect the dead.  Rather, like reputation, legacy can only 
influence and be influenced by the living.  Subjective meanings afforded to reputation and legacy 
only have substance within the realm of the living, which is of no consequence to other states of 
existence.  Following death, no individual is ever directly subjected to the repercussions of death 
or posthumous alterations to one’s legacy.   
Our understandings of death render it as either a gateway to an afterlife or the ultimate 
conclusion of existence; however, in either case, the ‘soul’ that has died need not confer significant 
meaning to the transient phenomenon of death, in and of itself.  It should be emphasized that fear 
of the loss of control over one’s legacy will appear irrational, if it is possible to definitively 
establish that one’s legacy can no longer impact the postmortem state.  An issue that could 
undermine the normative significance of a concept like legacy is the debate over the potential for 
posthumous harm, which we’ve briefly referenced. In order to assess the rationality of legacy and 
legacy-derived death anxieties, it is, therefore, necessary to further explore and discredit the 
concept of posthumous harm.  
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V. Posthumous Harm  
According to Epicurus, “death means nothing to us,” nor does it mean anything to the 
dead.59  “When I am, death is not. When death is, I am not. Therefore, we can never have anything 
to do with death.” 60  This assertion contradicts the mortal harm thesis by proclaiming that death is 
inconsequential and thus cannot harm one that is dying.61  Accordingly, if death is nothing, then 
legacy (which manifests only after death) must also be of no consequence.  So, from an individual’s 
perspective, one’s posthumous legacy becomes inconsequential to oneself after death, therefore 
relegating its contributions to end-of-life attitudes as unintelligible.  So pre-humous considerations 
re legacy and legacy-derived trepidations are largely unreasonable and potentially irrational.  
Before further investigating this assertion, we will attempt to demonstrate various reasons why the 
posthumous harm thesis positing the potential for such harms is incorrect, according to an 
Epicurean interpretation of death.62   
In this paper, an Epicurean view of death is largely favored.  However, the Epicurean stance 
regarding the impossibility of posthumous harm has been almost universally refuted or 
admonished as absurd, in favor of harsher Aristotelian views that favor a bleak afterlife in which 
the dead are condemned to suffer posthumously according to the fickle nature of the living.63  As 
a consequence, concerns re posthumous harm continue to have wide-spread bioethical 
implications, despite the fact that applications of such theories can be conclusively shown to 
negatively affect the living, in such cases as organ donation, etc.  However, our insinuations 
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63 Taylor, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics. 
 33 
regarding the irrationality of death anxieties (as a result of the frivolous nature of legacy) demand 
that Epicurean interpretations of death’s nature are upheld.  As positions on posthumous harm can 
also confer significant influence on the implementation of end-of-life measures that address 
mortality, this concept is worth investigating further.    
The relatively common deprivation account of death presumes that the dead can be 
deprived of the joys experienced by the living; such deprivation narratives commonly assert 
posthumous harm.  The ‘death is evil’ narrative, which proliferates in Western society, also 
provides support for claims positing the possibility of such harm.  However, the most common 
arguments in favor of Aristotelian views on posthumous harm currently rely on the Feinberg-
Pitcher model of harm, which has wide-spread bioethical implications. The anti-hedonistic 
intuitive approach of this model does not necessitate awareness of the harm being conferred; it is 
claimed that even if the dead are not aware of the harm they are enduring, it remains possible that 
they can be wronged.  By positing, as Pitcher does, that postmortem individuals can be harmed in 
the same manner as antemortem beings, various thought experiments can be asserted that would 
lead to the conclusion that posthumous harms can be conferred upon the dead.  But, while such 
thought experiments demonstrate the plausibility and intuitive nature of assuming posthumous 
harm, they fall short of proving that such harms can be retroactively conferred, especially if the 
events that confer harm are contingent on their sequential nature.  Such arguments in support of 
posthumous harm can often also be readily critiqued for their heavy reliance on intuitive 
processes64 for assessing rationality. 65,66 
                                                      
64The use of intuitive arguments for addressing philosophical issues has been previously criticized, but there is precedence 
for applying such arguments to analyses of end-of-life issues, e.g. posthumous harm, so we maintain the validity of this 
reasoning.  See Taylor. 
65 Williams, “Death and Deprivation.” 
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Because of the general assumption that ‘death is evil,’ intuitive arguments in favor of 
posthumous harm often appear stronger and more intelligible than the arguments against it.  This 
is because we often favor positing an antemortem state, rather than a true postmortem state.  
However, there are several valid counterarguments to Aristotelian postulations regarding 
posthumous harm; such counterarguments not only refute the possibility of posthumous harm but 
also favor the impossibility of the phenomenon.  An experiential view of death maintains that harm 
can only affect an individual, as long as the individual can experience the consequences of such 
harm.  So, if the postmortem individual lacks the ability to experience anything, then they cannot 
be harmed (or benefitted) from posthumous events.  Even if the dead remained aware of their 
legacy throughout their posthumous states, posthumous legacy would not affect them or serve 
for/against their self-interest, because of the lack of control they would be able to elicit over it and 
because of their inability to experience any of its potential consequences.67   
As we have previously mentioned, a deprivation-based theory of death would posit that 
death is always bad, because it deprives us of any possible good that could be attained from life.68  
In contrast, Epicurean views assert that death can never be harmful.  The existence of a posthumous 
reputation or narrative would thus serve no personal utility.  And, as our framework for assessing 
prudential rationality69 lies in utility and the satisfaction of self-seeking goals, it begins to become 
evident that legacy considerations may truly be irrational.  Control over temporary reputation may 
give us inaccurate impressions that we can control postmortem reputation or legacy.  In reality, we 
never had control over the latter position, because we never maintained complete control over our 
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deaths.  However, because we retain control over pre-humous reputation, we erroneously prioritize 
the role of legacy in end-of-life scenarios.  And, because we presently exist in our living forms and 
cannot see past our immediate evolutionary goals, we fail to correctly acknowledge our lack of 
control over the effects of legacy.  So, assumptions regarding the prevalence and importance of 
legacy continue to be widespread.  As a consequence, death anxieties proliferate, along with 
postulations regarding the nonexistent posthumous repercussions of reputation and legacy.  
To reiterate, Epicurean positions maintain that as long as an individual is alive, he is not 
dead; therefore, death cannot confer harm, if it only occurs following the absence of life.  Personal 
perceptions re the psychological implications of death might encourage intuitive arguments 
postulating posthumous harm, but, in actuality, it does not seem that individuals can either be 
harmed or wronged by death.  Regardless of the arguments and thought experiments used to posit 
posthumous harm, there are criticisms to be made that would negate the influence of intuitive 
assumptions re such harm.  If one is truly willing to accept the Epicurean stance, it becomes clear 
that posthumous harm simply cannot manifest.  This is due to fact that harm and wrongdoing can 
only be induced if we assume the deceased individual continues to participate in situations that 
would allow them to experience such offences.  Even the strongest arguments that assert the 
possibility of posthumous harm fail to prove conclusively that such harm is anything other than a 
possibility; thus, there is no reason to necessarily accept such arguments.70,71   
The impossibility of posthumous harm can also be ascertained by arguing that the well-
being of the decedent cannot be affected by such harm.  If well-being is correlated with pleasure, 
then pleasure is automatically deprived following the manifestation of a corpse (thus no further 
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harm is possible).72  While such insinuations regarding well-being would assume that a descriptive 
theory of hedonism (which may or may not prove to be conclusively true) and a deprivation theory 
of death are upheld, there is merit to suggesting such an account, as it would explain how we can 
expressly assume posthumous harm even though its expression cannot confer actual harm onto the 
decedent.   
 Furthermore, after someone dies, whatever preceded death, during life, is no longer 
consequential.  This is demonstrated by the separation of different stages of existence in the 
representative schematics that were presented in the previous section (Figures 1-2).  Even in the 
case of sentient postmortem beings, these entities would care only about the continuation of their 
selves in their own realm, but human existence would no longer concern them, as these two realms 
of existence would manifest as separate spheres.  A separation of priorities between the living and 
the dead is clearly warranted.  It is a relatively narcissistic presumption that leads some to presume 
that if the spirits of the dead were able to manifest and exist autonomously after death, they would 
be interested in the inconsequential lives of the living.  This concept can be further paralleled 
through an analysis of general beliefs regarding reincarnation.  If one is reincarnated and comes 
back as an animal, then they would only concern themselves with the continuation of the current 
animal host species.  According to Hinduism, an individual’s reincarnation into a new vessel 
following biological death can lead to the rebirth of a soul into a body belonging to a different 
species.  During one’s newly reincarnated life, the previous host species becomes irrelevant, except 
in terms of its classification as predator or prey.  When one no longer belongs to a group, there is 
no longer reason to concern oneself with the proliferation of that group’s existence.  In the same 
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vein, if, following death, we posit a postmortem state, then only that current state and realm would 
be of any consequence.  Therefore, it would be unlikely that postmortem harm could be induced 
from a different state of existence.   
These assertions do not attempt to claim that one’s evolutionary priorities to propagate 
individual ideas, knowledge, and genes were never important, but rather that these ‘goals’ are no 
longer posthumously relevant after one’s lifetime.  For example, there may be opportunities to 
posit a function for legacy within an ideological evolutionary theory based on memetics.73  Such 
a theory re ideological evolution necessitates the continued spread and proliferation of one’s ideas 
posthumously.   A preserved legacy is assumed to be one of the most fruitful ways in which one’s 
intellectual work may continue to thrive and contribute to the species’ general fitness.  While there 
is some merit to assuming that it would be possible that, as a result of changing views on legacies, 
one’s ideological evolutionary potential is harmed posthumously because of legacy, this 
assessment of legacy’s role inadequately relies on the erroneous assumption that a posthumous 
being’s self-interest remains rooted in the living human realm.   While living beings might be hurt 
by the effects of legacy in discrediting certain ideologies, the dead, themselves, can be in no way 
harmed or wronged.   
However, there are also other reasons why posthumous harm appears to be an irrelevant 
concern.  This is namely because of the heavy reliance on the irrational, yet widespread 
presupposition of immortality among humans.  Any sort of model that would necessitate such 
“backward causation” and retroactive punishment appears intuitively problematic.74  While the 
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notions of legacy and death serve a purpose among the living, they hold no established significance 
independent of life.  It is difficult to posit how an immortal soul would be affected by 
reinterpretations of legacy.  Following death, life either transitions into another version of life (the 
afterlife) or reaches a conclusive end; in either case, an individual’s personal posthumous legacy 
does not readily appear to be able to influence an individual following the occurrence of death.     
Until this point, however, we have been largely interpreting the effects of legacy on the 
postmortem state.  But the postmortem state is more commonly associated with physical harm.  It 
is just as necessary to take into account considerations about non-physical harm that are most 
frequently associated with posthumous effects on the antemortem person.  So, what of the 
antemortem state?  Is it possible to harm an antemortem being, even when it is not possible to 
physically harm a postmortem entity? 
Positing an antemortem person solves the problem of the subject that arises whenever one 
discusses posthumous harm and end-of-life matters.75  It is possible to ascribe posthumous interests 
to a deceased individual by assuming an antemortem state, as the deceased’s interests appear to be 
preserved posthumously.  However, the human ability to perceive the existence of absent objects 
or individuals is not unique to end-of-life issues.  Children slowly develop object permeance over 
the first two years of their development.76  Until a working memory and an ability to understand 
object permeance is developed, it truly is ‘out of sight, out of mind.’77  Understanding that objects 
(and individuals) can continue to exist regardless of our perception of them is critical to our 
abilities to function in everyday life, as evidenced by the emphasis developmental psychologists 
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place in studying object permeance. 78  But while there is a pragmatic pre-humous use to this 
ability, it will be argued that it is unnecessary to postulate antemortem entities posthumously.   
An antemortem state originally appears useful in allowing the decedent to posthumously 
maintain relationships and a status among the living.  However, the antemortem individual is its 
own lifeform; it can neither truly represent, nor replace the decedent.  The antemortem being 
actually resembles an anthropomorphized inanimate object.  Though a tree has interests (e.g. 
obtaining nutrients that would allow for its growth and survival) when it is ‘alive,’ we do not 
continue to ascribe these interests to the tree after it has been chopped down and used to make 
furniture.  Yet, despite its furniture-like status, we do tend to ascribe certain claims, rights, and 
interests to an antemortem being.   
While there are inter-subjective interpretations re an individual’s antemortem state that 
allow for general and communal acknowledgement of the entity, the existence of this entity is 
entirely dependent on living third-parties that may or may not be correctly postulating the 
decedent’s intentions.  After death, the antemortem being no longer accurately represents the 
decedent’s interests.  In fact, depending on the stage of the decedent’s life that is being referenced 
in order to posit an antemortem being, an antemortem person might not even represent the interests 
of the decedent immediately before they died.  Even in cases in which the decedent’s interests are 
well-documented, the perceived interests accredited to the antemortem state are time-stamped and, 
thus, not necessarily true to date.   
An antemortem state is believed to be intelligible within various societal and legal 
frameworks, due to its ability to regulate and facilitate matters that are pertinent to the living.  But 
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ascertaining the continued existence of an antemortem being is ultimately an unnecessary 
postulation, despite its perceived utility.  For example, one of the strongest reasons for positing an 
antemortem being would involve its potential role in justifying matters of inheritance and estate 
distribution.  Living people often maintain preferences regarding what happens to their assets 
following death.  And, from society’s perspective, it is important that there be a conventional way 
to address the distribution of these assets.  But, while an antemortem being is perceived to be 
intelligible re pragmatic legal considerations, such a being is ultimately unnecessary to maintaining 
the social constructs that we ascribe to its desires.  For example, viable living wills can be created 
decades before their implementation becomes necessary.  Therefore, claiming that an antemortem 
being maintains the same interests as were expressed in a decades-old document fails to take into 
consideration the many external factors that could influence a change in the decedent’s interests.  
It is not actually the antemortem being’s interests that are being preserved via posthumous 
rights.  Any interests or claims that may be seriously attributed to an antemortem entity are only 
viable if there is an actual contract that the decedent pre-humously prepared that may take affect 
posthumously. The rights that are being ascribed to the dead are merely rights that are derived 
from their once living selves.  The relationships, identities, and interests that are preserved by 
postulating a non-physical antemortem being do not necessitate such a postulation.  Rather than 
antemortem interests and claims, we arrange posthumous affairs according to contracts that were 
created by the living.  These contracts might have delayed execution dates that allow them to take 
into effect post-death, but they were still prepared by a living entity.  Therefore, positing an 
antemortem state is unnecessary.  Because regardless of the deceased’s actual interests pre or even 
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post-death, it is only contracts created by the decedent when he or she was still living and sentient 
that are adhered to above all other considerations.79  
Postulating an antemortem state is merely another unnecessary attempt to perpetuate an 
immortal conception of self.  The very postulation of an antemortem state hinges on our irrational 
assumptions re human immortality, but it has no real true significance.  Even in cases where the 
antemortem being’s interests would be expected to be most relevant (e.g. regarding estate 
distribution), it is clear that it is not actually the antemortem entity’s interests that are being 
represented.  Rather, matters of inheritance are actually arranged according to legal contracts, 
rather than the interests of the antemortem being.  The antemortem individual’s sequentially-
derived claims or interests are not actually preserved in the way that we generally acknowledge 
them to be.   
 Legacy can only be harmful or beneficial in as far as we postulate an antemortem or 
postmortem being that can be posthumously harmed.  Therefore, it was our intention to contradict 
both the mortal harm and posthumous harm theses, by claiming that 1) one is not harmed by their 
own death and 2) one cannot be harmed after their own death.  In conclusion, there is ultimately 
no cause to postulate the potential for posthumous harm from legacy’s ability to negatively affect 
the posthumous spread of one’s ideas, etc.  Therefore, in the next section, it will be possible to 
show that death anxiety, which may largely stem from concerns over legacy, is also irrational.  
This argument will be largely contingent on our discussion of postmortem and antemortem states.  
VI. Rationalizing Our Fears 
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One is often assumed to be pensive when accepting death, while irrational when fearing it.  
While we attempt to investigate irrational factors relating to existence in order to ascribe reason to 
them, such work is futile.  We do not recognize the irrationality of attempting to reason existential 
issues, so we continue to pursue justifications in order to validate our attitudes towards such 
concerns. According to Jungian definitions of rationality and irrationality, legacy, by its very 
nature, must be irrational due to its subjective nature as a perceptive tool.80  In Psychological 
Types, Jung states that “the [idealized] rational attitude which permits us to declare objective 
values as valid at all is not the work of the individual subject, but the product of human history. . . 
[Reason is] nothing other than the expression of man’s adaptability to average occurrences, which 
have gradually become deposited in firmly established complexes of ideas that constitute our 
objective values.”81  The nature of an emotionally-charged ‘complex’ can influence our 
perceptions and ability to rationally approach a subject; however, due to the autonomous nature of 
‘complexes,’ it is not the case that we always can distinguish between these feeling-driven beliefs 
and those that are reasoned. 82   
Rather than reason, thoughts and feelings regarding the future are usually guided by 
intuitive sources of understanding.83  However, there are merits to attempting to assess the 
rationality of these feelings.  While rational understandings and approaches to death anxieties 
might not necessarily confer comfort when addressing thoughts on dying, such conceptualization 
is necessary in order to prevent the damage incurred through the harmful spread of hypocrisies 
that such fears can often perpetuate.  Individual comfort with mortality is not a pre-requisite for 
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implementing necessary end-of-life legislation and policies, though some semblance of rationality 
often is.  In order to spur people to action (whether that action be education, outreach, or planning 
measures), mortality salience and competence is necessary. 
While we are attempting to use Epicurean stances to argue that death anxiety is irrational, 
the irrationality of these trepidations is not a new concept.  From as early as the works of Socrates 
and Plato, the philosopher has been acknowledged as he who is learning or training to die.84  
Colloquially, those who find peace with death are acknowledged as wise or ‘philosophical.’85  
Spinoza articulated this concept well, “a free man, that is to say, a man who lives according to the 
dictates of reason alone, is not led by fear of death, but directly desires the good, that is to say 
desires to act, to live, and to preserve his being.”86  The concept that fear is unnecessary and 
limiting because it restrains rationality (the ultimate manifestation of freedom) is emphasized in 
Spinoza’s philosophies.  Even using such an interpretation, it becomes obvious that the absence of 
irrational fears helps confer ultimate freedom in the form of rational understanding.   
While some might criticize Jung as being an obscurantist, there is merit to his assertions re 
‘complexes.’  Our biological predispositions and natural intuitive inclinations to fear death87 and 
ponder existence prevent us from identifying the irrationality of exaggerated negative attitudes 
towards death.  But, if one adequately identifies and explores the origins of exaggerated anxieties, 
these inaccurate and irrational mindsets become more evident.  After all, if a key source of such 
fears fails to seem reasonable, then it becomes evident that the fears, themselves, must be similarly 
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irrational.  The distinction between irrational and rational fears has repercussions in general society 
due to the implied consequences regarding the acceptability of partaking in rational fears.    
Depending on the source of the anxiety, there are different implications conferred regarding the 
value of its existence and thus the intentions of the agent re utility-based prudential rationality.  
When over-conflating the roles of autonomy or consciousness, for example, it can appear that there 
is utility to trepidations regarding mortality; such misplaced evaluations misleadingly inflate the 
significance of the human life forfeited by death.   
Death’s ambiguity has long complicated assessments of rationality.  Though it may be 
considered a relative evil in terms of individual human life, there are higher natural orders that 
necessitate death’s existence.  Therefore, with regards to death and dying, we cannot simply accept, 
as Aristotle does, that death is “terrible.”88  Spinoza once stated that “nothing can be evil 
through that which it possesses in common with our nature, but in so far as a thing is evil to us it 
is  contrary to us;” but, when Spinoza made such a claim, even he acknowledged that death is both 
contrary and necessary for our existence.89  Trying to imagine existence without death allows us 
to posit the gravity of death in conferring meaning to life: without death, there could be no life on 
Earth.  Despite its necessity, death sparks an array of complex feelings.  In this section, we hope 
to show that legacy-derived death anxieties should be categorized as both illegitimate and irrational 
according to epistemic and prudential considerations.   
Thus, in order to prevent inconsistencies regarding the utility of the source of these 
trepidations, it is very important to be able to establish their correct origin.  Our discussion on 
legacy serves to demonstrate that even concerns regarding a key source for thanatological fears 
                                                      
88 Aristotle and McKeon, Introduction to Aristotle. 
89 Melamed, “Spinoza on Death, ‘Our Present Life,’ and  the Imagination.” 
 45 
appear to be irrational.  Exploring the issue of such fears through the role of legacy confers greater 
clarity than simply discussing general death anxieties.   
As it relates to our argument, it appears that a prominent component used to derive both 
fears of death and dying relates to legacy, as a narrative of resilience and/or strength is at stake 
when contemplating both phenomena.  So, ultimately, neither an overemphasis of legacy nor 
thanatological fears are in the general self-interest of any individual; hence, the perceived 
irrationality of concerns surrounding these concepts.  Identifying a source of death trepidations to 
be contingent on the importance of human legacy has significant implications on this discussion 
of rationality.  In this paper, we will be specifically exploring two types of rationality: prudential 
and epistemic rationality.   
There are two basic standards with which to assess the rationality of emotions; these are 
cognitive (or epistemic) and strategic (or prudential) rationality.  Epistemic rationality is concerned 
with true representations and maintaining accurate beliefs of the world.  Meanwhile, strategic or 
prudential rationality is utility-based and contingent on the agent’s ability to participate in 
pragmatic decision-making and action-oriented judgments.  In both regards, we posit that death 
anxiety is irrational.  However, it should be noted that assessments of rationality, especially 
prudential rationality, are often contingent on potentially diverse assumptions regarding the role 
of death in society. 90,91,92   
The inability to properly identify the origin of death trepidations allows for unintelligible 
and irrational beliefs and behaviors to proliferate. By demonstrating the irrationality and harmful 
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consequences of conflating legacy, any emotional respite that is associated with extreme cases of 
death denial will ultimately be shown to be unintelligible.  While intelligibility does not equate to 
rationality, humans generally favor intelligibility, while aspiring to be rational creatures. We will 
be using epistemic rationality to demonstrate that legacy considerations are both epistemically 
irrational and unintelligible.   
When assessing emotions in terms of evidence and truth-oriented cognitive rationality, 
there are three elucidations of rationality that would be suitable to analyze: is death anxiety 
epistemically rational in terms of whether or not it is 1) merited, 2) appropriate, or 3) coherent?  
We will find that individual fears towards dangers leading to death may be justifiable, but that 
death anxiety, in its most general and abstract form, is ultimately irrational following this model.  
In terms of merit and fittingness, a fear directed at a known threat or danger could be effectively 
targeted so as to confer rationality; and, depending on the consistency of the manifestation of this 
individual fear, it may also likely qualify as coherent, as the danger conferred by an individual 
trepidation does not necessarily need to be justified outside of one’s belief system.  But, undirected 
fear towards the abstract theme of permeance is neither appropriate given the inevitability of the 
phenomenon, nor merited given its naturality.  Even if one believes that death is cruel, the inability 
to direct such general feelings of intimidation would also prevent a necessary degree of 
consistency.93   
With regards to epistemic rationality, many of the greatest philosophers94 viewed training 
for death as the principal vocation of philosophy.  And if preparation for death was a philosopher’s 
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main objective, how could it be rationally feared?  If we are always training95 for death, then death 
is less foreign then we are often led to believe.  So, epistemically, there is less evidence to support 
such intense emotional anguish that often results from the prospect of death.  Even postulations 
regarding evolutionary predispositions for experiencing death anxieties are limited when we 
consider the scope within which nature operates.  Furthermore, if one cannot be posthumously 
harmed (according to an experiential view of concept) or be impacted by their posthumous legacy, 
then it is epistemically irrational to take into consideration legacy or legacy-derived anxieties.   
With regards to epistemic rationality, it should be noted that, at some level, emotions and 
rationality can be perceived as natural antagonists (or, at the very least, as being negatively 
correlated).  The Stoics were particularly adamant about the false and deceptive representations 
that could be conferred by emotions.96  But, just because there is often an inverse relationship 
between the two, it does not necessarily entail that we cannot assess the rationality of emotional 
responses in terms of utility.  In fact, a forced separation between the mechanisms of action for 
emotional and rational thought can result in overly simplified and incorrect postulations; after all, 
to some extent, rational behaviors and beliefs are, ultimately, contingent on emotions in terms of 
their ability to structure and redefine general perceptions.97  The assessment of most judgments is 
contingent on emotional influences and their evaluations of possible benefits/repercussions; it is 
impossible to completely dissociate human judgments, beliefs, and behaviors from emotions, so 
all decision-making is contingent on sentiments and emotive sensations, to some extent.98 
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While epistemic considerations can be used to address whether or not death anxieties and 
legacy concerns are intelligible, there is much merit to assessing prudential rationality, as well.  
Thanatological fears warrant a utility-based rational analysis, because such considerations can 
greatly impact the application of rationality theories.  While some may argue that death anxieties 
serve an individual’s self-interest by encouraging caution, we would disagree as to the extent of 
these perceived benefits in conferring prudential rationality.  Fear of death as it is exhibited within 
human cultures and societies does not necessarily lead to the furtherance of the species, and, on an 
individual level, can encourage narcissism that can deliberately undermine the individual’s 
interests.  The biological utility conferred by death anxiety is often exaggerated, as it fails to take 
into consideration the dual nature of benefits conferred by risk-taking and risk-aversion tendencies; 
therefore, as a consequence of perceived evolutionary incentives for risk-aversion and death 
anxiety, the utility of concerns regarding mortality are overly exaggerated, despite the fact that 
they can confer severe consequences.  In their current unchecked and exaggerated state, human 
death anxieties appear harmful, unintelligible, and prudentially irrational.   
Assessments based on prudential rationality are useful in order to demonstrate the lack of 
utility associated with legacy considerations.  Our analysis regarding the prudential rationality of 
legacy-derived death anxieties will be rooted in the pragmatic utility that such fears confer.  By 
addressing the utility of human behaviors in regard to self-interest, it is possible to navigate the 
treacherous landscape of conflicting and sometimes hypocritical influences that death anxiety 
might have.  Spinoza referred to this conceptualization of human rationality as rationality “with 
the principle of seeking [one’s] own profit,” which implies self-worth and personal 
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satisfaction.99,100  Hobbes similarly defined rational beings as those acting in their own long-term 
self-interest; and, while not all decisions can be simply attributed to versions of ‘psychological 
egoism’ or the ‘selfish system,’ it provides a good mechanism by which to assess the rationality 
of our subjective emotive states.101,102   
An expected utility theory of rational choice that emphasizes prudential rationality offers 
several ways to interpret the value of possibilities: either as a measure of the agent’s beliefs or as 
a measure established through evidence.103  Such a mechanism allows for values associated with 
individual outcomes to be appraised; the outcome with the highest degree of expected utility 
presents as the rational choice.  Assessments of possible outcomes take into consideration the 
maximal set of feasible outcomes in order to assess and rank the worthiness of each individual 
choice or decision.  Sets of ensuing outcomes are contingent on states (events outside the control 
of the individual agent) and acts (the agent’s decision-making options and preferences) that 
influence each possible consequence.104  Such utility-based rationality assessments will work well 
with other efforts to address end-of-life issues through a consequentialist lens.105  While we will 
not go into detail regarding how numerical estimations of the value and the probability of each 
outcome can be evaluated, by qualitatively investigating possible outcomes regarding death 
anxiety, it remains evident from our assessment why a lack of trepidations confers a more favorable 
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outcome, especially if we negate the perceived outcomes that we have already attempted to 
discredit in earlier sections (Table 1).   
Table 1. Matrix depicting proposed outcomes regarding fear responses, in the form of pre-emptive 
legacy-based death anxieties.   
 
According to such a model, engaging in pre-emptive death anxieties as a response to legacy 
concerns would accentuate behaviors leading to a more troubled existence (Table 1).  Of course, 
the conspicuousness of such estimated evaluations is contingent on the agent’s ability to correctly 
prioritize outcomes; but with regards to posthumous consideration re legacy, which we have been 
attempting to assess over the course of several previous sections, recollections of one’s life 
(legacy) after death become immaterial for our utility-based assessment of rational choice.  In fact, 
the increased ability to prepare for end-of-life measures and considerations when not stifled by 
exaggerated mortality concerns presents much greater benefits for both the agent and the living 
survivors.  When one also takes into consideration the extent with which autonomy and agency 
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are evidently revered among humans, especially in Western cultures, it becomes obvious that 
outcomes taken without fear considerations ought to be rationally preferred. By exploring the 
repercussions of death anxieties in this fashion, people should not want to choose to continue to 
live in fear.   
According to this example matrix, legacy considerations re the ability to be recalled after 
death by the living are omitted (Table 1).  Legacy considerations appear prudentially rational, or 
at least intelligible, only as long as we posit an antemortem being, because this state is contingent 
on legacy; however, we’ve already ascertained that antemortem postulations are unnecessary.  
Therefore, it would not be prudentially rational to use legacy to support an impractical social 
construct. In fact, the self-deception involved in emphasizing the significance of legacy and 
antemortem entities would arguably illustrate epistemic irrationality.  And, without legacy, there 
is no antemortem state with which to ascribe posthumous interests or rights.  Whether or not legacy 
affects how one is recalled after death by the living is, therefore, of no consequence to the decedent; 
so, this outcome has been omitted from the example matrix.   
However, the simplified matrix presented in Table 1 was built according to the 
interpretations available to us from our ongoing argument; it assumes a critical role for legacy in 
establishing death anxieties.  Discrepancies that may undermine such a model can manifest 
regarding whether fear is purely a choice (an act), the expression of acts’ and states’ individualized 
natures, and the agent’s perceptiveness regarding the utility conferred by death anxieties.  For 
example, we could easily present another example matrix that prioritizes an agent’s beliefs 
regarding rational choice, rather than the degrees of choice.  In this second model, the agent’s 
beliefs might emphasize evolutionary incentives for maintaining a basic threshold of fear, so there 
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could be a clear manipulation (according to agent beliefs) of outcomes that would create the 
misperception that rational choice is relative, which is not at all what we are trying to demonstrate. 
Thus, the model should be built according to an evidence-based rational model, rather than one 
that takes into account individual agent beliefs. 
There are other failings to such a model regarding its transitivity, incompleteness, and 
independence that we will not explore in great detail.106 The point of this discussion regarding 
rational fears is only to demonstrate that more consideration is necessary from an individual level 
in order to assess the rationality of death anxieties.  Our propositions are useful in that they can 
circumnavigate more complex theories of rationality; therefore, such reasonings would be more 
applicable when attempting to enact behavioral changes among the everymen.  But, unfortunately, 
a complete discussion on the various models of rational choice (and the ways in which values of 
possible outcomes could be assessed and interpreted) warrants another paper.  We do, however, 
hope that such a simplified model will still aid us in demonstrating that there is merit to assessing 
our attitudes towards death for their prudential rationality, rather than moral rationality.107   
While attempting to pragmatically analyze the conceptualization of rational human fears, 
it should be noted that it may be imprudent to label the fears as rational or irrational, in and of 
themselves.  Psychological and evolutionary human inclinations to fear certain effects are 
infrequently random and do usually serve some purpose.  Again, recall the distinction Spinoza 
asserts when discussing fear of death; Spinoza assesses the options of the rational man that would 
prevent him from subjugating himself to such fears, rather than simply labelling the fear, itself, as 
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irrational.108  But, by identifying legacy as a source of these fears and by establishing concerns 
over legacy as prudentially irrational, it becomes possible to label legacy-derived death anxieties 
as irrational.  If death anxieties are significantly concerned with legacy (a posthumous concept that 
influences the living but is incapable of affecting the dead), then exaggerated death trepidations 
are irrational.  And, therefore, it becomes evident that some of the most controversial debates in 
medical ethics regarding end-of-life issues are being erroneously addressed.   
  While there are many pressing concerns in bioethics that will be affected by mortality 
salience and the categorization of legacy-derived death anxieties as irrational, we will now attempt 
to apply this reasoning to one of the most prominent issues facing the discipline: physician-assisted 
death.  If fears of death and dying are irrational, then arguments promoting the legalization of 
physician-assisted suicide and other forms of voluntary euthanasia should be vindicated, in as far 
as they are based around thanatological fears.  Of course, the nuances of this bioethical dilemma 
relating to implementation (e.g. criteria for qualifying for voluntary euthanasia, etc.) are not 
addressed through the categorization of death anxieties as irrational; however, prominent 
arguments both supporting and discouraging the legalization of such end-of-life measures may be 
viewed in a different light as a result of such an interpretation.   
VII. Physician-Assisted Death  
Voluntary euthanasia can be defined as either a passive or active act that is undergone 
purposely in order to avert natural death by providing painless means of dying in efforts to mitigate 
a declining quality of life (which is often the result of terminal illness); meanwhile, assisted suicide 
is an intentional act of suicide with the aid of a third-party that is capable of providing relevant 
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means for conferring death.109  It can be perceived that physician-assisted suicide is an attempt at 
mitigating inconsistent views that the intrinsic worth of human life transcends patient well-being.  
However, as long as we incorrectly conflate the irrational notion of legacy, it will be difficult to 
acquire widespread support for medically-assisted death.  Even in cases of legalized physician-
aid-in-dying, the option is severely underutilized by those that could be eligible to opt into such a 
program.110,111   
Throughout most of the text, we have been largely referencing the Epicurean view that the 
actual passage of death is “nothing” and thus is incapable of conferring subjective meaning, as 
“when we exist, death is not; and when death exists, we are not.”112  From the standpoint of death 
anxiety and our trepidations concerning mortality, the Epicurean interpretation of death that we 
have been favoring does allow us to maintain that, from a normative perspective, it would be 
prudentially irrational for an agent to subject themselves to such trepidations if there are no 
significant outcomes (or benefits) to be conferred from death re the agent’s own status.   
If death is nothing, then death anxieties serve no purpose and can deleteriously obscure 
decision-making abilities.  However, this Epicurean stance will cause us some issues with regards 
to our advocation for physician-assisted suicide, as the rational status of acts of voluntary 
euthanasia will be in jeopardy if death cannot be interpreted as a choice.  Despite the fact that an 
Epicurean interpretation of death does not confer viable moral complications re the legalization of 
physician-assisted suicide measures, it also does not provide a strategic reason to pursue death 
under any scenario; if death can neither confer benefits nor harm, its manifestation would not offer 
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any favorable incentives that would warrant choosing it.  Why would one choose something that 
is neither beneficial, nor harmful?  If all outcomes of an event are truly neutral, then the event does 
not necessarily warrant a choice.  Though we have generally preferred to refer to death as a 
transient phenomenon that is largely inconsequential to the decedent, if death truly is 
inconsequential (in contradiction to the mortal harm thesis), then problems regarding the prudential 
rationality of physician-assisted death could arise that would contradict our attempts to argue for 
the widespread legalization of such measures.113  
It is now necessary to establish whether or not Epicurean views on the rationality of death 
anxieties can be reconciled as to support the widespread legalization of medically-assisted death 
options, despite potential obstacles that may present in terms of prudential rationality and 
implementation.114  Attempts to reconcile the discrepancies between rational and irrational 
considerations regarding suicide largely involve emphasizing interpretations of life, rather than 
death.115  A hedonic evaluation of the benefits that could be conferred by a good life take 
precedence according to this theory.  As long as the agent can ascribe worth to life, there is reason 
for the living agent to subsist.  Using this interpretation of life, existence appears to be something 
one continuously chooses to opt into.  Suicide is irrational, then, as long as the agent believes that 
his/her life is worth living; but an agent maintains the ultimate right to identify and assess the 
worth of personal life.  For example, it is not always in the patients’ best interest to prolong life 
when holistic patient well-being is in jeopardy; but patients’ assessments re the worth of their lives 
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are heavily reliant on the quality of life and subjective patient well-being, which can be measured 
using happiness scales.116,117,118   
Schopenhauer postulates that it is conceivable to approach death as freedom from the 
suffering of existence.119  The interest-impairment theory of harm also asserts that a death event 
can only be posited to confer harm if it prevents the continuation of a life that the decedent was 
interested in continuing.120  Such views are consistent with recent studies that have been 
documenting the principal reasons why patients are choosing to seek physician-assisted suicide 
options.  For example, the predominant cause for which patients requested active forms of 
physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands was due to reports of “intolerable pain,” followed 
closely by concerns regarding a loss of dignity.121  Therefore, there is merit to interpreting 
physician-assisted death through the lens of ‘choosing to escape suffering,’ rather than choosing 
death.122   
Challengers of physician-assisted suicide argue that the act of self-harm (and by extension 
self-killing, the ultimate manifestation of such harm) is irrational and must, therefore, be 
forbidden.123  But, McMaham proposes that the delineation of suicide as irrational can be 
reconciled with Epicurean values in order to encourage measures that would allow for the 
implementation of medically-assisted death.124 McMaham’s reconciliation strategy is also 
interested in assessing the utility of whether or not to continue to choose life (depending on the 
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worth conferred by life), rather than choosing death.  But the problem remains regarding whether 
or not we can assume that rational suicide would really be prudentially rational, if there is no 
incentive to make a choice regarding death according to Epicurean doctrine?   
While McMaham’s analysis could support the prudential rationality of medically-assisted 
death, it is not entirely sufficient.  While McMaham’s theory does somewhat address this issue by 
maintaining that death is not an object necessitating choice, it does have its limitations.  For 
example, it could be argued that this position hinges too closely on a linguistic argument: to choose 
life or to choose death revolve, in principal, the same choice.  In fact, even McMahan identifies a 
potential discrepancy, in that to claim that a judgment regarding an act (of life) is good necessitates 
a “relative alternative” that would need to be classified as “good or better” or “bad or worse;” and, 
the alternative, death, can neither be “good [or] evil. . .[because of the implication] of sentience.”125  
However, there are notable cases in which seeking to evade unnecessary harm and distress due to 
terminal illness seems like a more prudent option than postponing death for the sake of some 
unsubstantiated moral or theological principle that is highly influenced by irrational and emotive 
fears.  With regards to one’s own self-interest, seeking to end pain appears prudentially rational 
even if it involves choosing death in order to confer relief.126   
It is likely that some will remain unsatisfied by this attempt at reconciling Epicurean views 
with pro-legalization arguments.  While it must be conceded that Epicurean interpretations of death 
show that choosing death via physician-assisted suicide is not inherently irrational (from a 
prudential perspective), our arguments may not necessarily demonstrate rationality. While being 
able to establish that physician-assisted suicide is not inherently irrational can be a useful claim, it 
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is not fully satisfying.  As a very stark Epicurean view on death has been favored until this point, 
it does not appear possible to completely ascertain the prudential rationality of voluntary 
euthanasia on the merits of such a strict stance on death, alone.  It is only possible to determine 
that it would not be irrational for an agent to subject themselves to such trepidations if there are no 
significant outcomes (or benefits) to be conferred from death re the agent’s own status.  McMaham 
would argue that voluntary euthanasia can be prudentially rational, because death can mitigate the 
harm and suffering endured by choosing life.  However, the limitations of such an argument are 
too great to ignore. 
If death is nothing, then death anxieties can generally serve no purpose and can obscure 
decision-making abilities.  So, this rationality analysis may not be sufficiently convincing, on its 
own.  However, while we maintain that death cannot harm the decedent, this does not necessarily 
establish that physician-assisted death would not be permissible on account of the good that would 
be conferred on general society.  The lack of harm conferred upon the deceased does not 
necessarily exempt assisted death measures from potentially being assessed on the basis of general 
utility.  And the societal benefits that could be ascribed to such acts may, in turn, indirectly benefit 
the agent.  In order to assess the effects on third parties, however, it will be necessary to utilize 
another framework of reference: consequentialism.   
Consequentialist considerations regarding the moral permissibility of an act re its ability to 
maximize net good can offset the limitations of using only a rationality argument rooted in 
Epicurean views on death to address bioethical issues.127  Accounts re the interests of third-parties 
warrant a consequentialist analysis to address any moral considerations related to societal goods.  
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Therefore, using such an analysis, it is possible to further reconcile this issue of assisted death to 
ascertain that, despite our preferred adherence to Epicurean doctrine, we can argue that physician-
assisted suicide can be prudentially rational if we can ascertain that third-party considerations can 
benefit the individual and contribute to personal self-interest, e.g. acknowledgement of societal 
good may be useful in establishing a sense of personal enlightenment. 128   
To circumvent the limitations of a rationality argument based on Epicurean views, it is 
worth exploring bioethical issues (especially in terms of application) using a consequentialist 
approach, as well.  The potential for one’s death to impact other human beings is something we 
have yet to explore extensively, following our attempt to prove the impossibility of conferring 
posthumous harm.  However, the impossibility of posthumous harm in relation to the decedent 
does not negate the potential for harm and wrong to befall third-parties.129  In fact, if a decedent’s 
death is indeed inconsequential, then it will only be possible to assess the utility of death in terms 
of the harm/benefits it potentially inflicts on other beings.  While one could argue that choosing 
death in accordance to the possible benefit that it confers to third-parties would not be in adherence 
to our prioritization of a self-interest model for prudential rationality, the truth is that when one 
simultaneously considers McMaham’s reconciliation theory along with third-party incentives, 
such concerns can be remedied.  It is in the self-interest of the patient to avoid suffering, and it is 
in society’s self-interest to provide the means for them to choose death.   
The various forms of consequentialism (act-based, rule-based, etc.) are interested in 
ascertaining morality by studying the overall consequences of every situation.  The morality of the 
action, itself, is irrelevant, as long as such an action brings about a positive net good.  Assessments 
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attempting to evaluate the maximization of good incorporate multiple elements, including 
happiness, relief of suffering, freedom, survival, etc.  Consequentialist frameworks can be 
controversial, due to the disregard of duty, rights, intentions, etc.  Concerns regarding the apparent 
flexibility of such a framework are also prevalent.  However, when paired with utility-based 
rationality assessments, it is possible to more thoroughly understand and interpret applied 
bioethical issues by considering consequentialist, as well as rationality, analyses.130   
In the case of physician-assisted death, it is especially useful to note the good outcomes 
that can be attributed to such end-of-life measures, as many arguments against voluntary 
euthanasia are contingent on consequentialist frameworks that are concerned with the 
ramifications of rational suicide on the worth of human lives, autonomy, etc. . In fact, it has been 
previously posited that the ‘slippery slope’ argument against acts of voluntary euthanasia is 
‘entirely consequentialist,’ in that concerns re the implementation of voluntary euthanasia are 
troubling even if the actions, themselves, are morally permissible.  While such concerns are valid, 
it is also necessary to acknowledge a potentially net positive outcome for the legalization of 
physician-assisted suicide, despite issues with standardization and implementation.  For example, 
the economic benefits and relief of suffering conferred by implementing physician-assisted suicide 
are indisputable.131,132      
A simple and generally objective assessment re maximal good relates to economic 
incentives.  With regard to the maximization of economic good, there are times when choosing 
death could, to some extent, prevent more harm than choosing life.  The simplest argument to 
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make in order to illustrate this dichotomy would be to analyze the economic benefits of legalized 
assisted death measures.  Monetary estimates regarding the value an average human life tend to 
range from $6 – $9.5 million.133  From a health perspective, each additional year of ‘quality’ life 
is quantified at $50,000 – $129,000.134  These strictly numerical averages inform decisions for 
healthcare, end-of-life care, etc.  To put things into perspective, the economic value of an extended 
year of life equates to the price of a relatively high-performing vehicle.135  Meanwhile, the cost of 
keeping a terminally ill patient comfortable can be significantly more.  
These economic estimates re human worth are generated for a purpose, in that global 
bureaucratic institutions are designed to implement measures based on cost-benefit analyses.  
Despite widely varied and largely dated estimates of human life, cost-benefit analyses attempt to 
assess outcomes from a strictly quantifiable and objective lens, often regardless of moral 
implications.  It is for this reason that most private and public insurance companies will deny 
procedures that are not guaranteed to extend an individual’s life for at least one additional year if 
the cost of that treatment surpasses the $50,000 benchmark. 136  Dying has a very high cost.  In 
fact, Medicare, alone, paid approximately $55 billion in treating the terminally ill during their last 
two months of life during the 2009 fiscal year; only 20-30% of these costs actually successfully 
impacted patient well-being.137  In these cases, the cost of care is often borne by governmental 
entities; in the United States, the majority of end-of-life care costs are covered by Medicare, 
Medicaid, and Veteran Administration or Department of Defense sponsored health programs.138  
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Furthermore, in the United States of America, healthcare providers continue to favor 
aggressive, very costly care options for terminal cancer diagnoses, etc., as opposed to more 
merciful palliative care and hospice options.139  And when limited resources are expended on the 
care of hopeless terminally ill patients, the costs of extending an individual’s life (despite the low 
quality of life) for a few months can be severe.  Comparatively, costs of more merciful assisted 
death options are much more reasonable.  In fact, the necessary dose of Secobarbital (also known 
as Secondal), which is one of the most heavily prescribed drugs used to facilitate physician-assisted 
suicide, only costs $3,000. 140   
Therefore, though we don’t generally want to consider the economic ramifications of end-
of-life treatments, such consequentialist analyses can simplify outcome and utility-based 
arguments.  The truth is that even in cases when the terminally ill can afford treatment, it may not 
be economically prudent to do so.  From a strictly economic perspective, one could argue that the 
option of seeking physician-assisted suicide would generally be significantly more practical.  After 
all, palliative care or exotic care are often costly, outsourced, and unguaranteed, so other more 
inclusive options need to be considered, as it is never in the best interest of the individual to suffer 
relentlessly.   
Proponents of legalization argue that economic incentives could be the basis for the 
pragmatic legalization of assisted death options, even if moral condemnations against physician-
assisted suicide forever exist.  When considering the possible personal and public financial 
ramifications of treatment, death might not seem like such an irrational choice, especially when 
considerations regarding suffering are made.  And though, from an ethical perspective, economic 
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incentives would not prevent the moral condemnation of physician-assisted suicide measures, the 
relativism and inconsistency of moral arguments present weaker platforms with which to address 
such issues.  Rather, using through a consequentialist framework to pragmatically assess morality 
in terms of net outcomes can be much more prudent. 
Of course, merely assessing the rationality and utility of end-of-life measures does not 
necessarily solve pertinent issues with the implementation of such assisted death measures.  There 
are countless arguments for and against legalization that relate specifically to mechanisms of 
implementation.  For example, some complications regarding the implementation of physician-
assisted suicide concern the ability of potential candidates to make informed autonomous 
decisions, especially in cases of cognitive decline.  Difficulty with standardizing eligibility and 
assessing autonomy means that legalization of physician-assisted suicide still faces an uphill battle.  
Unless these issues are addressed, the net good that can be consequentially attributed to end-of-
life measures relating to physician-assisted suicide will be diminished. So, in order to prevent 
societal repercussions, such obstacles need to be addressed.141,142,143      
Other current challenges re physician-assisted suicide often pertain to the lack of 
standardized legislation needed to regulate the publicness of the act, the lack of choice, potential 
abuses, patient/illness discrimination, and physician/patient hierarchies.  Another concern is 
whether or not patients will always be able to distinguish between a right to die and a duty to die.  
For the purposes of this report, we are not going to explore implementation issues in-depth.  We 
are primarily trying to demonstrate that assisted death options are not inherently wrong.  So, we 
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are only interested in the utility of institutionalizing medically-assisted death as it relates to 
addressing concerns regarding death anxiety.   Demonstrating that fears of death should not 
negatively impact the potential rationality of physician-assisted suicide will consequently allow 
for substantive pragmatic considerations to take precedence over moral implications of such 
measures.144, 145, 146    
Outside of physician-assisted suicide, there are also many other end-of-life and access to 
care issues that are being labelled as irresolvable moral problems.  While we have only explored 
medically-assisted death measures, in this section, our assertations regarding the irrationality of 
death anxieties can be widely applicable across the discipline.  In fact, due to the prominence of 
legacy’s role in many end-of-life matters, future analyses re other bioethical problems are likely 
warranted.  In fact, legal rights conferred onto the dead should ideally only be designated based on 
their utility in regulating the acts of the living; however, in their current state, posthumous rights 
tend to prioritize sociocultural norms that emphasize honoring the dead at any cost.147  Hence, the 
perpetuation of a ‘rights’ narrative when referencing decedents.148  Yet, while in certain situations, 
the wishes of the dead can facilitate complex legal issues, the truth is that in the cases of organ 
designation, the prioritization of the deceased’s ‘wishes’ can significantly impact the living.  We 
tend to widely acclaim the theatrics of individual hospitals that show extreme reverence towards 
the dead, e.g. ‘the walk of respect’ conferred upon brain-dead organ donors; and, though these acts 
can be very admirable, they are ultimately unnecessary from the perspective of the decedent, who 
can no longer experience such reverence.149  While survivors and relatives of the recently deceased 
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may benefit from such formalities, perpetuating a narrative of posthumous respect and rights 
encourages the proliferation of an inconsistent and harmful immortality narrative.  The dead are 
not impermeable, and their status among the living is often unnecessarily preserved and 
anthropomorphized in this fashion as a response to the perpetuation of immortality narratives.     
It is not enough to simply recognize the general uselessness of death anxieties, if 
conflations of immortality and legacy continue to proliferate in society.  It is also necessary to 
confront such trepidations and inconsistencies; in order to promote a conceptual understanding of 
death to the general populace, we believe it would be in everyone’s best interest to engage with 
death, as the Stoics did. 150   Stoic responses to death were to confront, rather than to avoid it.151  
Seneca, a Stoic writes, “to do battle with. . .grief [associated with death], and. . . dry those weary 
and exhausted eyes, which already, to tell you the truth, are weeping more from habit than from 
sorrow. . . [In] effect this [is a] cure. . . [Otherwise,] what, I pray you, is to be the end of it?”  And, 
in order to minimize the debilitating repercussions of wide-spread death anxiety, this philosophy 
would certainly be useful.  While end-of-life issues would largely benefit from a more rationalistic 
analysis, this will only be possible if death anxieties are substantially limited.  Otherwise, even if 
legislation condoning end-of-life practices, like physician-assisted suicide, becomes universalized, 
there is little hope for proper implementation, as long as the stigmas against mortality remain 
prevalent.   
VIII. Conclusion 
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The impact of death on life is often unrecognized or unacknowledged because of the nature 
of mortality.  In accordance with societally-acceptable norms and as part of a natural defense 
mechanism against emotional disturbances, human attention tends to consciously revolve around 
survival – rather than departure.  Though a sentient awareness of the ticking clock can have major 
effects on human behavior, the forced ignorance and denial of this awareness in the death-denying 
cultures of the Western hemisphere dictate attitudes towards both death and life that enforce an 
unhealthy relationship with mortality.  Death is ultimately inevitable, so the benefits that death 
anxieties can confer by encouraging behaviors that might postpone it are limited; however, the 
effects on quality of life and general rationality that such anxieties encourage can have severe 
consequences.152   
While our arguments might be critiqued for their reliance on intuitive mechanisms of 
assessment, a generally unfavorable Epicurean doctrine of death, and weaker rationality-based 
assessments, such critiques do not necessarily undermine the strength of our main points regarding 
the interconnected natures of legacy, death anxiety, and mortality salience.  As long as immortality 
narratives (via mechanisms like legacy) continue to fuel concepts regarding posthumous harm and 
substantiated versions of the afterlife, it will be difficult to alleviate concerns surrounding end-of-
life measures.  After all, such rhetoric prevents proper attenuation of mortality salience. For 
example, Spinoza generally rejected death anxieties as irrational, but even he continued to promote 
theories of the mind that were rooted in immortality: “The human mind cannot be absolutely 
destroyed with the body, but something of   it   remains   which    is   eternal.”153,154 The extensive 
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acknowledgement of immortality within general society fuels misconceptions and ignorance 
regarding human mortality. 
Because death serves as the ultimate deadline – once it arrives, there is no longer any 
chance at reprisal or revision – death needs to be maneuvered rather than dreaded unnecessarily.  
It is not a choice; it is a target that we’re all destined to reach, at one point or another.155  Its 
manifestation is as much of a certainty as our very existence: it is essential to the very foundation 
of our effective world, and no one is immune. Addressing how the advancement of life perpetuates 
a death narrative riddled with falsehoods is necessary to rationally navigating a controversial and 
oftentimes hypocritical domain.  By constructing an argument which necessitates an exploration 
of death anxiety through the lens of posthumous existence, we have attempted to resolve these 
conflicts of thought by proposing the origin of exaggerated death anxiety in Homo sapiens to 
largely be the consequence of obsessions with and legacy.   
Legacy is an illusory and ultimately inconsequential construct.  It is entirely contingent on 
a fluid variable of time and cannot manifest as a constant state. Its manifestation may be useful as 
a crutch and comfort mechanism for survivors attempting to comprehend the death of a loved one, 
but, in principle, personal legacy is generally immaterial.  And, despite the fact that our normative 
stance on the absurdity of legacy may not be representative of current psychological tendencies, 
we maintain that legacy should not be a factor of rational decision-making regarding end-of-life 
matters.  Whether death entails the complete cessation of existence or a passage into an altered 
state of existence, legacy is insignificant to postmortem and antemortem beings.  Yet, there are 
numerous instances in which it seems as if the dead are even prioritized above the living.   While 
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posthumous harm is sometimes posited as a means of establishing a tangible function for legacy 
after death, the irrationality of postulating human immortality renders the entire discourse 
surrounding posthumous harm as problematic.  So, this cannot be used as a defense for the role of 
legacy in the afterlife.  Therefore, if legacy can only impact the living, then it is irrational that 
death anxiety is being disproportionately influenced by fears regarding the loss or damage to one’s 
posthumous legacy in the material realm. 
Ultimately, the narrative-oriented priorities of our species allow for hypocrisies to prevail 
by idolizing legacy.  The application of our discussion on legacy and the irrationality of death 
anxiety can be used to discuss a variety of bioethical debates, especially those pertaining to end-
of-life measures.  A lack of proper acknowledgement re mortality salience instigates issues that 
are usually at the forefront of existential and mortality concerns.  And as long as largely irrational 
legacy-derived death anxieties continue to proliferate and receive wide-spread acceptance, it will 
not be possible to properly address such concerns.  With regards to physician-assisted suicide, 
specifically, there are substantial measures and shifts in attitudes necessary before such voluntary 
euthanasia programs can become de-stigmatized.  Many factors intersect to contribute to this 
stigmatization, so simply proposing a more rationalistic approach to death anxiety will not be 
enough to address all concerns, especially those rooted in moral arguments.  However, 
thanatological trepidations need to be addressed, if any progress is to be made. 
Apart from physician-assisted suicide, there are countless other end-of-life dilemmas that 
are not being given the proper attention, as a consequence of general populace’s discomfort with 
addressing mortality issues.  Ultimately, we need to give ourselves permission to confront and 
address our anxieties surrounding death from multiple platforms.  Only then will death no longer 
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be branded as an ailment of our own humanity, but rather perceived as an essential component to 
the natural order of life.  However, as long as we continue to allow legacy to subvert our abilities 
to reasonably approach mortality salience, end-of-life issues will remain overtly stigmatized, and 
solutions will be slow and far in-between.  We are a naturally narcissistic species, but our inability 
to seek solutions that serve our interests with regards to issues relating to death and dying are a 
result of our failure to appropriately identify where our interests lie.  The dead are dead; so, let 
them rest, and let us concern ourselves with the interests of the living.  
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